INCOMMENSURABILITY AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

MATrHEWADLERt
INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis is a flourishing practice, desperately in need
of a justification. By "cost-benefit analysis," or "CBA," I mean the
monetized version: the version where the various benefits and costs of
a governmental project are reduced to monetary sums and then aggregated, with total money costs subtracted from total money benefits, so that the project ultimately is assigned a single net money
amount, positive or negative, the sign of which is in turn taken by the
analyst as a significant (if not conclusive) indicator that the project
should or should not be approved.! This type of analysis has become
2
widely used. In 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order
enjoining federal agencies that "[r]egulatory action... not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation out3
weigh the potential costs to society," and requiring the submission of
reports detailing the costs and benefits of large projects to a presidential oversight agency, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) .
In 1993, President Clinton replaced the Reagan order with a new one,
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Kathy Baker, Ruth Chang, Richard Craswell, Frank Goodman, Peter Huang, Stephen
Law
Perry, Eric Posner, Julia Rudolph, and Kim Scheppele; to the participants in the
and Incommensurability Symposium; and to the participants in an ad hoc workshop at

Penn, for their helpful comments.
' See LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 17-25 (1981)

(distinguishing between monetized and nonmonetized cost-benefit analysis). For why
I add the caveat "if not conclusive," see infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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but retained the central requirement that a project's benefits outweigh its costs-" [e] ach agency shall.., propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs" 5-and the central mechanism of
OMB review. It bears noting that neither the Reagan nor the Clinton
orders expressly requires the monetization of costs and benefits. But
the orders certainly can be read to license and encourage monetization,7 and, over the last several decades, federal agencies have indeed,
to a significant extent, relied upon monetized CBA as a test by which
to approve or reject projects. And yet-this is the desperate partCBA has been roundly criticized by most scholars who have looked
seriously at its normative grounding. The prevailing view-not just
among the moral philosophers8 and legal scholars9 who have written
about the moral justification for CBA and its cousin, the Kaldor-Hicks
test, ° but also among the welfare economists who have done so"seems to be that these tests are morally indefensible. There is now a

5 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1 (b) (6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1994).
6 See id. § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 644-48.
7 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, at pt. III.A.2 (1996) (stating that"[t]o
the fullest extent possible, benefits and costs should be expressed in discounted constant dollars").
a The philosophical literature includes: DANIEL
M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S.
MCPHERSON, ECONOMICANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93-99 (1996); David Copp,
The Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 THEORY & DECISION 65 (1987);
Donald C. Hubin, The MoralJustificationof Benefit/Cost Analysis, 10 ECON. & PHIL. 169
(1994); Peter Railton, Benefit-Cost Analysis as a Source of Information About Welfar4 in
VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING
55 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds., 1990). I suggest that skepticism about
CBA and Kaldor-Hicks is the prevailing view, not that this view is universal. See, e.g.,
Hubin, supra (defending CBA).
9 Prominent works by legal scholars on the normative foundations of Kaldor-Hicks
or CBA include: JULES L. COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, in
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAw 95 (1988); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 126-50 (1987); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980).
I01 say "cousin" because, given the so-called Boadway paradox, Kaldor-Hicks
and
CBA are not equivalent. See Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, A Review Article:
The Case Against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23
CAN. J. EcoN. 471, 476-82 (1990) (discussing nonequivalence of Kaldor-Hicks and
CBA).
" See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 15-16, 96-101, 262-72
(1984) (criticizing CBA and Kaldor-Hicks); Blackorby & Donaldson, supra note 10
(same).
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truly startling disjunction between, on the one hand, the practices of
government agencies and (more broadly) the applied economists and
public-policy analysts who have generated a vast body of work detail2
ing the monetized costs and benefits of regulatory measures,' and, on
the other hand, the skepticism about the moral status of CBA that
prevails in the scholarly literature.
Is the skepticism warranted? Let me distinguish between CBA as
a criterion of moral rightness or goodness and CBA as a morally justified

decision procedure.3 The thrust of the scholarly criticism has been that
CBA is not the former. It is not the case that, just because a project's
monetized benefits are larger than its monetized costs, there is moral
reason to favor the project. And this criticism is plausible. It is difficult to see how CBA marks out something morally important, even
prima facie, about government projects or, more broadly, about options for choice. Consider two possible defenses of CBA as a moral
criterion, which might be called welfare-dependent and welfareindependent. A welfare-dependent defense (which, as far as I know,
no one has seriously pursued) 14 tries to show how CBA is equivalent to
a moral criterion of overall well-being. On this defense, a project
increases overall well-being-which, after all, surely is a morally significant if not conclusive feature of projects-just in case it satisfies
CBA. But why would that be the case? Standardly, a project's
monetized benefits are defined, within CBA, as the cumulative
amount of money that the "winners" from the project, those whose
welfare it improves, would be willing to pay in return for securing it;
conversely, a project's monetized costs typically are defined as the
cumulative amount of money that the "losers" would require as compensation for accepting it.' s The welfare-dependent defense of CBA
as a moral criterion says, thus, that a project improves overall wellbeing if and only if the cumulative amount that the winners would

12 See, e.g., W. KIP VIscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSI-

BILITIES FOR RISK 51-74 (1992) (surveying the large body of empirical literature valuing

death and injury risks in dollars); Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why
Economists Should Care; J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 1994, at 3, 5 n.3 (noting the very large

number of "contingent-valuation" studies).

"'See DAVID

O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 216-17,

256-62 (1989) (drawing and discussing this distinction).
14 See PeterJ. Hammond, InterpersonalComparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are
and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200 (Jon Elster &

John E. Roemer eds., 1991) (surveying theoretical constructs for interpersonal welfare
comparisons).
'5 See infra text accompanying notes 28-33 (defining CBA).
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pay exceeds the cumulative amount that the losers would require. If
this is true, then the following can never obtain.
Tivial InterpersonalBenefitsfor Rich Winners
The winners from the project are very rich. They own large stocks of
money and other resources and would be willing to pay, in dollars, large
sums to secure a project that, truly, has only a trifling effect on their own
well-being. The losers, by contrast, are quite poor. The project has a
significant negative effect on their well-being, but they would require
only a moderate sum in compensation. Because of their poverty, the
project losers can use moderate amounts of money to purchase improvements in the conditions of their own lives (and in overall wellbeing) that are even greater than the negative effects on them wrought
by the project. So the project passes the CBA test but, if implemented
(without any payment to the losers), decreases overall well-being.
A welfare-dependent defense of CBA entails, implausibly, that this
scenario is impossible. If, for example, the construction of a particulate-emitting device produces a delightful reddish tinge to sunsets
that the rich view from afar, at the cost of considerable pulmonary
discomfort to the poor neighbors who live nearby, it is surely true or
at least possible that the project decreases overall well-being even
though the project's monetary benefits are greater than its monetary
6
CoSts.

The alternative defense of CBA, as a criterion of moral rightness
or goodness, is a welfare-independent defense. On this defense, CBA
marks out a moral feature which is not equivalent to a project's contribution to overall well-being, but is morally important nonetheless.
Historically, at least within welfare economics, this has been the standard way to think about CBA. The view has been that CBA is normatively defensible just insofar as it tracks a Kaldor-Hicks test. KaldorHicks, in turn, originated in an intellectual milieu in which it was
7
thought that interpersonal welfare comparisons were impossible.
The effect on "overall well-being" of a project that improved the wellbeing of some, while making others worse off, was thought indeterminate. Rather, and alternately, it would count as a reason in favor of
the project that the winners could afford to compensate the losers,
making at least one person better off and no one worse off. This is
what the Kaldor-Hicks test asks: Is there a costless redistribution from
"' See Copp, supra note 8, at 74-77 (arguing that a project with net monetary benefits can decrease overall well-being); Railton, supra note 8, at 67-69 (same).
17 See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 8, at 84-100 (summarizing
history of
Kaldor-Hicks criterion and CBA).
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winners to losers such that, if performed together with the project,
the project-plus-redistribution would constitute a true Pareto improvement? Yet the Kaldor-Hicks test is vulnerable to the same kind
of objection routinely leveled against proposed moral criteria that
incorporate the merely hypothetical rather than actual consent of
affected persons. A person has the power to change her moral position by promising, consenting, and undertaking other such performative utterances; but a necessary condition for this kind of change is
18
that the utterance actually be performed . The fact that, hypothetically, the rich winners from a project that decreases overall well-being
could afford to compensate the poor losers counts as no moral reason
whatsoever in favor of the project.
In short, CBA is indefensible as a criterion of moral rightness or
goodness-or so I will assume here. This is not to say, however, that
CBA is indefensible tout court. We are considering, after all, a government practice: a decision procedure by which (an increasing
number of) federal agencies and other government institutions assess
projects. At bottom, the question whether government institutions
should employ this decision procedure is a moral one. But that question, in turn, is not answered by saying that the relevant criteria of
moral rightness or goodness are not incorporated directly into the
practice. It could be the case that-by virtue of the epistemic limitations of agencies in determining what morality requires, plus their
tendency, more or less strong, to pursue nonmoral aims-morality
warrants a legal requirement that agencies employ a decision procedure more algorithmic, or verifiable, than the direct application of
moral criteria.'9
This is what Professor Eric Posner and I have argued in an unpublished work on CBA. In particular, we have suggested that CBA is
most plausibly defended as a decision procedure by which to implement the moral criterion of overall well-being. We claim that whether
a project increases or decreases overall well-being is a morally rele21
vant, if not conclusive, feature of that project. And CBA will, in
'8 See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd,Justifiably Punishingthe Justified,90 MIcH. L. REV. 2203,
2305 (1992) (distinguishing between actual and hypothetical consent).
'9 See BRINK, supra note 13, at 216-17, 256-62 (discussing moral grounds for decision procedures other than the direct application of moral criteria).
20 See Eric Posner & Matthew Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Welfarist Defense
(Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2 See Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 157,
164 (1994) (arguing for a view of morality where "deontological maxims... define
and patrol the borders of consequential justification"); ef. SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMrTS
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some (not all) contexts, be both reasonably congruent with the welfare criterion and significantly easier to implement than that criterion
itself. In particular, CBA is reasonably congruent with overall wellbeing where money is equally productive of well-being as between
winners and losers. Sometimes it is not, as in the case of the reddish
sunset, but sometimes it is, and-before scholars conclude that the
widespread and increasing practice of monetized CBA is simply misconceived-CBA should be evaluated in this light, as a welfarist decision procedure. "Welfarist" here just means "relative to a criterion of
overall well-being."2 Why is monetized CBA a more plausible welfarist decision procedure than one that scales costs and benefits in
terms of some other item, such as roses, or corned beef, or liberty?
Money, unlike roses or corned beef, is a primary good, that is, it is
broadly (instrumentally) advantageous for well-being;2 and, unlike
liberty, has an existing public scale in the sense that many constituents
of welfare, namely, marketed goods and services, already are scaled
publicly in terms of dollars.
This is where incommensurability comes into play. A small but
growing body of work by philosophers and legal scholars is critical, or
at least skeptical, about monetized CBA, and links this criticism more
or less directly to the fact of "incommensurability." I have in mind,
particularly, Cass Sunstein's important article, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 24 in which he defines incommensurability as follows:
"Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized." 25
Sunstein argues that incommensurability, thus defined, underwrites a
serious objection to monetized CBA:

OF MORALrrY 47-72 (1989) (describing "ordinary morality" such that persons have a

general reason to promote the good but are not required invariably to do so, given
their options and constraints).
22 "Welfarist" is used in this specific sense, and not more
loosely as denoting moral
criteria that incorporate welfare in some way, such as criteria that require equalizing
well-being, or equalizing or maximizing resources for well-being. For a discussion of
the difference between these criteria and the criterion of overall well-being, see
RichardJ. Arneson, Liberalism, DistributiveSubjectivism, and Equal Opportunityfor Welfar4
19 PHIL_ & PUB. AFF. 158 (1990).
See generallyJOHNRAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 90-95 (1971) (discussing primary
goods, including "rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth").
24 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779
(1994).
Id. at 796 (emphasis omitted).
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A simple or flat judgment that a mountain is "really worth" $10 million
is inconsistent with the way that we (or most of us) value the mountain.
This is because the mountain is valued through a different kind of
valuation from the $10 million; the former produces awe and wonder,
whereas the latter is for human use-though admittedly $10 million may
produce a (different) sort of awe and wonder as well. These points hold
even if many people might be indifferent between $10 million and the
mountain in the sense that they do not know which they would choose if
26
both were offered ....

A broadly similar objection has been raised by Elizabeth Anderson,

Richard Pildes, and Margaret RadinY
Does "incommensurability" indeed undermine monetized CBA
understood as a welfarist decision procedure? This Article tries to
answer, or at least to clarify that question. Part I of the Article explains a bit more what CBA involves. Part II defines "incommensurability" and distinguishes among three different (arguable) grounds of
incommensurability, which I term: (1) conventional ordering failures; (2) esoteric ordering failures; and (3) second-order considerations. In the remaining parts of the Article, I consider, in turn, the
import of each for CBA. I conclude that options can indeed be
"incommensurable," by CBA, with respect to overall well-being, but
the true grounds of incommensurability are quite different than the
existing legal and philosophical literature suggests.
I should emphasize that I am interested here in an internal critique of CBA: a critique relative to the moral criterion of overall wellbeing. CBA may, of course, be vulnerable to an external critique-for
example, if the effect of agency projects on overall well-being is morally insignificant. However, I do not believe that, and in any event do
not have the space here to consider an external critique of CBA. The
welfarist defense of CBA is not necessarily a utilitarian defense. Its
premise is that the effect of projects on overall well-being is morally
significant, not that this effect is morally conclusive. For purposes of
this Article, I assume the welfarist premise to be true. Part of the excitement and novelty of the "incommensurability" objection to CBA,
at 786-87.
See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHics AND ECONOMICS 190-216 (1993);
MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 115-22 (1996); Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory Stat4 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1995).
For an "incommensurability" critique of monetary and numerical choice procedures
within the philosophical literature, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 106 (1990); and within the general literature on
CBA, see Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs , in RISKS,
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED, supranote 2, at 104, 113.
26Id.

2
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raised by Sunstein and others, is that even if the welfarist premise is
true-indeed, even if utilitarianism is true-the defender of CBA
needs to think hard about that objection.
I. WHAT Is CBA?
Before turning to incommensurability, we should be clear about
what CBA involves. CBA is a special kind of decision procedure. It is
28
a scaling procedure, one which works as follows: For each of the
agency's options, assign to that option (one or more) numbers equalling its net monetized benefits or costs relative to (one or more) baseline options; and then choose the option with the highest number (if
the same project has the highest number from every baseline).2"
Cost-benefit analysts typically refer to the baseline option as the
"status quo," and to options other than the status quo as "projects"; I
will follow that locution here. Note that there are various ways that a
project's monetized benefits or costs might be defined, depending,
for example, on what set of reference prices are employed, or on
whether monetary amounts are weighted.3" Typically, "benefits" and
"costs" are defined in terms of so-called "compensating variations."'
In turn, the concept of "compensating variation" typically is defined
in terms of the "willingness to pay" or "accept" of, respectively, the
winners and losers from the project-that is, in terms of their preferences. If the project improves PI's welfare, then her "compensating
variation" (or CV) is the amount of money that P1 would be "willing
to pay" such that, if the project were chosen and that amount were
deducted from Pl's resources (with project-world prices held constant), she would be indifferent between the project world and the

For an explanation of different types of scales, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING

93 (1986); HENRY E. KYBURG JR., THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 1-22 (1984). By a
"scaling procedure," I mean a scale (a rule for assigning numbers to options) that,
further, satisfies a nonsuperfluity condition, and that therefore can serve as a decision
procedure. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing scaling procedures and nonsuperfluity condition).
See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 11, at 195-291 (explicating sum-of-

compensating-variations test). For a less technical exposition, see E.J. MISHAN, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 159-215 (4th ed. 1988). For a further discussion of the baselinedependence issue that I advert to here, see infra Part IIIA2.
soSee BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 11, at 196-210 (distinguishing between

.compensating" and "equivalent" variations); Copp, supra note 8, at 77-79 (discussing
weighting).
s See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 11, at 6-7, 20-21 (employing compensating
variation as the monetary measure of an individual's welfare change).
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status quo world. It is the amount such that, as between a world in
which the project is chosen and that sum is extracted from her, and
the status quo world, she prefers neither. Similarly, if the project
degrades P2's welfare, then P2's compensating variation is the
amount of money such that, if P2 were paid that amount and the project were chosen, P2 would prefer neither the project world nor the
status quo world.l
The total "benefits" of the project are, in turn, defined as the aggregate of CVs from the project winners, while the total "costs" are
defined as the aggregate of CVs from the project losers. In this Article, I will focus upon this particular, standard conception of CBA-as
the sum of compensating variations.33
An initial problem, for anyone who wants to defend CBA as a welfarist decision procedure, is to reconcile its preference-based approach to monetization with the nature of well-being. Unless P's
compensating variation matches, more or less, the effect of the project on her own welfare, it is hard to see how the welfarist defense of
CBA can even get started. Compensating variations are defined, as I
have just said, in terms of preferences, not welfare. On this definition,
a person's CV is the amount that she would be willing to pay or be
paid in return for the project, not the amount 'that would make her
just as well off. The two definitions are not equivalent. Of course,
what motivates the preference-based definition of CV is the view,
prevalent within economics, that P's preferences are constitutive of
her welfare. 4 If P prefers some state of affairs to another (at least
with sufficient information), 5 and the first state of affairs obtains
rather than the second, then Pis comparatively better off; if Pis indif32

See id. at 40-43, 201-05 (defining compensating variation).

'sTechnically, the procedure described here (determining and then aggregating
individual CVs for the project), is employed where the agent/analyst knows with certainty the project's outcome. In the case of choice under risk or ignorance, where the
agent/analyst cannot predict the outcomes of options with certainty, monetized costbenefit analysis is more complicated. See id. at 226-34, 322-28 (discussing cost-benefit
analysis under uncertainty). For simplicity, this Article focuses on the case of choice
under certainty. But the argument I develop here applies quite generally and regardless of how the cost-benefit procedure for choice under risk or ignorance is defined.
The agent will have reason not to use a cost-benefit procedure in choosing between
options only if conventional ordering failures occur or if certain second-order considerations obtain.
For illuminating discussions and criticisms of the link between preference and
welfare within welfare economics, see HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 8, at 71-83;

L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE,

HAPPINESS,

AND ETHICS 113-22 (1996).

See Tyler Cowen, The Scope and Limits of PreferenceSovereignty, 9 ECON.
261-67 (1993) (discussing and criticizing informed-preference view).

& PHIL 253,
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ferent between the two (at least with sufficient information), then her
well-being is unaffected. But the preference-based view of well-being
is wrong. To say that P "prefers" S1 to S2 is just to say that P ranks S1
over S2. 3 We might, in turn, want to draw a connection between this
ranking, by P, and P's choices-we might say that P, in preferring S1
to S2, is necessarily disposed to choose S1 over S2-or we might omit
this connection. The problem, in either event, is that the reasons
underlying this ranking are unrestricted. P might, for example, rank
S1 over S2 for moral reasons. But if so, and if S1 rather than S2 occurs, then, although P's preference for S1 has been satisfied, P is certainly not necessarily comparatively better off. Notoriously, moral
and egoistic considerations can conflict for a given actor; but to deas constituted by unrestricted preferences implies the
fine well-being
3 7
opposite.
This point has real, practical consequences for CBA. Much of the
data for CBA, nowadays, comes from so-called "contingent valuation"
studies.? These studies use survey rather than market data to determine CVs, across the population, for various goods, typically nonmarketed goods. Citizens are asked how much they would be willing to
pay or accept to, say, prevent the destruction of a wilderness area,
tolerate the elimination of a species, purchase an improvement in
visibility, or incur an increase in the rate of workplace accidents.
Sometimes, citizens refuse to respond to such questions, or respond
with very large (or very small) dollar amounts.39 A respondent might
state, for example, that no dollar amount would be sufficient to compensate her for the species' elimination, or that she would pay her
entire stock of wealth (or nothing at all) to prevent the wilderness
area's destruction. The fact that preferences can be motivated by

On the nature of preference, see Arneson, supranote 22, at 161-64. A full philosophical analysis of the closely related notion of a "want" is provided by ROBERT AUDI,
ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 35-55 (1993).
s' For discussions of this point, see Allan Gibbard, InterpersonalComparisons: Preference, Good and the IntrinsicReward of a Life, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
165, 173-75 (Jon Elster & Anund Hylland eds., 1986); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest
and the Concept of Self-Sacrfice; 10 CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1980); Amartya K Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critiqueof the Behavioral FoundationsofEconomic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317
(1977); David Sobel, On the Subjectivity of Welfare; 107 ETHICS 501 (1997).
3 See CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed.,
1993) (describing and analyzing contingent-valuation methodology); ROBERT
CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS:
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989) (same); Symposium, Contingent Valuation,J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 3 (same).
" See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 38, at 30-38 (describing this phenomenon).
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moral rather than egoistic considerations is a partial explanation for
these types of responses. 0 If the respondent believes that it is morally
wrong for the species to be eliminated (independent of how much
money is paid to her), and this belief drives her unrestricted preference or ranking for the project worlds (the worlds in which the species is eliminated, plus some dollar amount is paid to her) relative to
the status quo, then her "willingness to accept," defined on unrestricted preferences, is indeed infinite. But this fact about her unrestricted preferences does not, in turn, mean that the species'
elimination will make her life irremediably worse. She might be a
materialist, who gains great enjoyment from the things money can
buy and has no personal interest in endangered species; she might
not watch them, work to preserve them, or have personal projects tied
up with them. Their existence makes no difference to her own wellbeing, and a very small amount of money paid to her, in the project
world, would make that world better for her. But she ranks the status
quo world over the project world, all things considered, because she is
convinced that eliminating the species is morally wrong-say, because
the existence of a species is highly valuable independent of human
well-being,4' or because the gains to overall well-being from eliminating this one are not worth the costs.
How should the welfarist defender of CBA respond to this difficulty-that well-being is not equivalent to the satisfaction of unrestricted preferences, and that, more generally, the significance of
even restricted preference for well-being remains highly controversial? The best response, I suggest, is to sever the conceptual connection between CVs and preferences. A person's CV should instead be
defined as her welfare equivalent. For the remainder of this Article, I
will use the term "CV" or "compensating variation" to mean a person's welfare equivalent, not her willingness to pay or accept.
CVs Defined as Welfare Equivalents
If a person P gains from a project, her CV is the unique amount of
money42 such that, deducted from her resources in the project world,

" It is not a complete explanation, for, as I discuss at greater length below, re-

spondents may take themselves to be obliged not even to think about the relevant

goods in dollar terms. See infratext accompanying notes 108-11.
" See HOLMES ROLSTON, III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHicS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN
THE NATURAL WORLD 126-59 (1988) (defending this view).
42 Welfare economists sometimes equate CVs with the smallest amount that a loser
would be willing to accept, or the largest amount that a winner would be willing to pay.
See MISHAN, supra note 29, at 180-82 (defining CVs this way). But given standard as-
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and holding constant project-world prices and the connection there between well-being and commodity bundles, Pis precisely as well off in the
project world as in the status quo world.4 If a person P loses from a project, her CV is the unique amount of money such that, added to her resources in the project world, etc., she is again precisely as well off in one
world as in the other.

Theories of well-being standardly are divided into three types: an
objective-list theory, which says that P is on balance benefited by Si
relative to S2just in case she more fully realizes in Si the balance of
welfare-constituting values (such as the value of musical or scientific
accomplishment), independent of any desire, approval, endorsement,
or other pro-attitude by P for S1 over S2;4 a mental-state theory, which
says that P is on balance benefited by Si relative to S2just in case she
more fully realizes in Si the balance of welfare-constituting mental
states (such as the sensation of gustatory pleasure); and a desire-based
or preference-based theory, which says that P is benefited by S1 relative
to S2just in case she has the right kind of desire or preference for
46
is
S1. 45 CBA, redefined as the aggregate of welfare equivalents,
well-being.
meant to be agnostic among these types of theories of
This redefined CBA is no longer committed to an unrestricted preference-based theory, or indeed to any preference-based theory.
Rather, it is committed only to the two following premises: (1) on the
sumptions about an increasing and continuous connection between money and welfare, see infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing these assumptions), the
economist is entitled to say something stronger: that the CV or welfare equivalent is
the unique money amount. So I will define CBA as the sum of unique welfare equivalents and then, later on, define a relaxed cost-benefit measure (CBA*) that omits the
uniqueness assumption. All the points I make about CBA-the possibility of poor
tracking, the irrelevance of esoteric ordering failures, etc.-are also true of CBA*.
s An additional stipulation, that money is used optinmally by P for her benefit, is
needed to ensure that the link between money and welfare is at least nondecreasing. I
will not try to specify that stipulation here.
"' More precisely, one should say "independent of any further desire, approval,
endorsement, or other pro-attitude by P," because the fulfillment of certain objective
values, say the value of play, may be taken to entail the satisfaction of certain proattitudes. Notwithstanding this qualification, I would argue that any genuine objective-list theory will include some values the satisfaction of which does not entail the
satisfaction of pro-attitudes, for otherwise the theory becomes simply a variant of a
desire-based theory. This definitional issue is not one I need to pursue here, however,
because nothing in this Article hinges on precisely where to draw the line between
objective-list and desire-based theories.
" For a philosophical overview of theories of well-being, see GRIFFIN, supra note
28, at 7-72; SUMNER, supranote 34, at 45-137.
46 The "aggregate of welfare equivalents" is the sum of welfare equivalents (CVs)
for the project winners minus the sum of welfare equivalents (CVs) for the project
losers.

1998]

INCOMMENSURABILITYAND COST-BENFIT ANALYSIS

1383

correct theory of well-being, CVs will be well-defined (that is, for each
project and each person affected by the project, there will exist a
unique sum of money that precisely compensates her welfare gain or
loss), as will the sum of CVs, and (2) the sum of CVs will track, with
sufficient accuracy, the effect of projects on overall well-being.
This is clearly more robust than the traditional defense of CBA
that links it specifically to a preference-based theory. If the correct
theory of well-being turns out to be a different kind of theory, but the
premises I have just articulated still hold true, then we still have a
viable, welfarist defense of CBA. Conversely, if the correct theory of
well-being turns out to be a preference-based theory, and the premises do not hold true, then the welfarist defense of CBA will fail regardless of the truth of the traditional, economic view of well-being.
But do the premises hold true? That, in essence, is the problem
of incommensurability for CBA. More specifically, the failure of the
premises comprises a particular, and significant, ground of incommensurability-what I will call a "conventional ordering failure." Let
me now distinguish between that ground of incommensurability, and
two other arguable grounds that, I will claim, are less significant.
II. WHAT IS INCOMMENSURABILITY?

"Incommensurability," in one sense, means the absence of a scale
or metric. 47 More precisely, given that we are interested here in the
practical implications of "incommensurability" (its implications for
choices by agents), we might say that "incommensurability" in one
sense means the absence of a scalingprocedure: a procedure for choice
4 See Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND
PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997) ("[If ncommensurable items cannot

be precisely measured by a single 'scale' of units of value."). For other entries in the
philosophical literature on incommensurability, see ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 4464; GRIFFIN, supra note 28, at 75-92; SUSAN HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS 254-70 (1989);
JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 53-75 (1993); ISAAC LEVI, HARD CHOICES
(1986); NUSSBAUM, supra note 27, at 107;JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITYOF FREEDOM 32122 (1986); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 89-118
(1997); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 211-40 (1990); DAVID
WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 239-62 (1987); John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal
Reasoning; 38 CLEV. ST.L. REV. 1 (1990); and T.K. Seung & Daniel Bonevac, Plural
Values and Indeterminate Rankings, 102 ETHICS 799 (1992). As Professor Chang ob-

serves, "incommensurability" can also be used to denote "the idea, spawned by the
writings of Thomas Kuhn, that evaluation across different conceptual schemata, ways
of life, or cultures is impossible." Chang, supra,at 1. The philosophical literature here
cited is not concerned with "incommensurability" in the Kuhnian sense, and neither
am I in this Article.
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between options that (1) assigns numbers to options in some fashion,
and (2) directs the agent to choose the option with the highest (or
lowest) number. 8 This might be fleshed out further, as follows.
Incommensurability: A PracticalDefinition

(1) Options are incommensurable, by a particular scaling procedure,
for an agent, with respect to a particular normative criterion, if in light
of that criterion the agent has (normative) reason5 not to use that scaling procedure in choosing between those options.
(2) Options are incommensurable, simpliciter, for an agent, with respect
to a particular normative criterion, if in light of that criterion the agent
has reason not to use any scaling procedure in choosing between those
options.
(3) Options are incommensurable, simpliciter; for an agent, if in light of
the totality of normative considerations the agent has reason not to use
any scaling procedure in choosing between those options.
I should emphasize one feature of this definition, which will prove
important in my discussion of esoteric ordering failures. Options are
"incommensurable" for an agent by a scaling procedure D1 or simpliciter, if that agent has reason not to use that scaling procedure or any one.
This feature of the definition captures the practical and critical import of the claim that options are "incommensurable." To say that
48Further, a scaling procedure must satisfy a nonsuperfluity condition. The rule
that assigns number one to the "best option for choice," number two to the "next best
option for choice," and so on, is a scale, but not a scaling procedure, because once we
know what the best option, next best option, and so forth are, we can make the choice
among them without assigning numbers. Because CBA clearly satisfies the nonsuperfluity condition, and is therefore not just a scale but a scaling procedure, I will not try
to be more precise here about how that condition should be formulated.
4'By "options," I mean simply those actions that the agent is considering. See
MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCrION TO DECISION THEORY 6 (1987) ("A
decision ... involves a choice between two or more options or acts...."). The clever

critic of CBA will note that CBA cannot be used to evaluate an action that is deliberationally complex in the following way: the action, say, of "building a bridge after using
a decision procedure other than CBA." This is true; but the arguments advanced in
Part V show that, if CBA is the right decision procedure for choosing between simple
actions without this deliberative caveat ("building a bridge," "not building a bridge"),
then the corresponding deliberationally complex actions are not better qua welfare,
than the simple actions.
" Here and throughout the Article, "reason" denotes a normative, rather than a
motivating, reason. My concern, and that of the "incommensurability" literature, is
what agencies ought to do-specifically, whether they ought to use CBA. My argument
does not depend upon a particular analysis of "normative reason," but I am happy to
use Michael Smith's: "[T]o say that we have a normative reason to [do something] in
certain circumstances C is to say that, if we were fully rational, we would want that we
(do that] in (2" MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 181 (1994).
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options are "incommensurable" is to say something about the reasons
that an agent does or does not have. Further, it is to say, not merely
that the use of a scaling procedure by the agent is a matter of normative indifference, but more robustly that the options are incommensurable, that is, that there is reason against using a particular scaling
procedure or any one at all. So it is both fair and illuminating to define "incommensurability" as entailing the existence of reason for the
agent against using a scale.
To be sure, the term "incommensurable" is ambiguous. It has
been used in the literature in connection with such (seemingly) diverse phenomena as the plurality of values,5 ' the incomparability of
options, 2 the existence of goods constituted by certain constraints on
our attitudes,5 as well as the absence of a scale for measuring options.54 Why do I pick out "the absence of a scale" as the relevant
sense of "incommensurability" for purposes of the welfarist critique of
CBA? To begin, what unifies the seemingly diverse phenomena hitherto discussed under the rubric of "incommensurability" just is their
connection to the absence of scales. The plurality of values implies,
among other things, that the monist's natural scaling procedure, in
which options are measured in terms of the one value that the monist
takes to be exclusive, will not capture reliably the true relative value of
options. To say that options are "incomparable," that is, neither better, nor worse, nor precisely equal, is again to say that no real-valued
scale can represent how the options truly relate, because one real
number must be either greater than, less than, or precisely equal to
another. And the kind of attitudinal constraint discussed in the literature is, precisely, a constraint on thinking about options in numerical terms. 5s
But beyond all this, defining "incommensurability" as the absence
of a scale is appropriate here because it is the definition most generous to the welfarist critique of CBA. For CBA is simply one kind of
scaling procedure. As I have already explained, CBA assigns to each
option (one or more) numbers equaling its net monetized benefits or
See, e.g., KEKEs, supra note 47, at 53-75 (linking incommensurability and plural-

"

ism).

See RAz, supra note 47, at 322-28 (defining incommensurability as incomparabil-

2

ity).

See id. at 345-53 (discussing "constitutive incommensurabilities").
See Chang, supra note 47, at 2 ("[L]et us henceforth reserve the term

51

'incommensurable' for items that cannot be precisely measured by some common
scale of units of value .... ").
55 See infra text accompanying
notes 108-11.
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costs relative to (one or more) baseline options, and then directs the
agent to choose the option with the highest number (if the-same project has the highest number from every baseline) .56 Thus, any claim
that there is welfarist reason for agencies not to use CBA in choosing
between options is a claim that those options are "incommensurable-for it is a claim that there is welfarist reason for agencies
not to choose between the options using the scaling procedure that
CBA constitutes. If we were to use a different, narrower definition of
"incommensurability," the incommensurability critic of CBA properly
might object that we have ruled out, by definitional flat, some sound
My definition of
objection of hers to this scaling procedure.
objection.
"incommensurability" is not open to this
In short: (Two 6r more) options are "incommensurable"foran agent, by
CBA, with respect to overall well-being ifthe agent has welfarist reason not to
use CBA in choosing between those options. Given the breadth of this
definition, it becomes important to distinguish among the various
(arguable) grounds of incommensurability. I will distinguish three
arguable grounds: conventional ordering failures, esoteric ordering
failures, and second-order considerations. By a "conventional ordering failure" I mean this: The numbers assigned by CBA to options do
not represent 57 how the options truly relate with respect to overall
well-being, insofar as options are related by the trichotomy of conventional value relations. By an "esoteric ordering failure" I mean this:
The numbers assigned by CBA to options do not represent how the
options truly relate with respect to overall well-being, insofar as options are related by value relations other than the trichotomy. Finally,
by "second-order considerations," I mean considerations other than

As this definition suggests, and as I explain at much greater length below, CBA
may fail to assign a number to some or even all of the options in a given choice situation. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the sum-of-CVs might be undefined). Such a
failure, when it occurs, might be taken to render CBA a deviant scaling procedure, or it
might instead be taken to mean that CBA fails as a scaling procedure at that point. If
the latter, then a claim that an agent ought not use CBA in a choice situation where
CBA fails to assign numbers to all the options is not, technically, a claim that those
options are "incommensurable" by CBA, for "incommensurability" as I have defined it
here concerns reason not to use a scaling procedure. Nonetheless, because such
failures may be an important ground against the use of CBA as a decision procedure, I
have included Part III.A in my discussion. And certainly, if a failure to assign numbers
makes a decision procedure a deviant scaling procedure, rather than no scaling procedure at all, such a failure technically can be a grounds of incommensurability.
17 See KyBURG, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing the function of scales in representing
a measured attribute).
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conventional or esoteric ordering failures by virtue of which the agent
has welfarist reason not to use CBA.
The trichotomy of conventional value relations is: better than,
worse than, and precisely equal.55 Imagine, for example, that a project is truly better than the status quo with respect to overall wellbeing. Then, if the number assigned by CBA to the project-its sum
of compensating variations-is zero or negative, we have a conventional ordering failure. Imagine, instead, that the project is incomparable with the status quo with respect to overall well-being. The
project and status quo are not ordered by the conventional trichotomy; instead, the project is neither better, nor worse, nor precisely
equal to the status quo with respect to overall well-being. And yet,
CBA assigns the project a number which is either higher than, lower
than, or precisely equal to zero. We then have an esoteric ordering
failure. Finally, imagine for example that the project is truly better
than the status quo and CBA assigns the project a positive number,
but these options are such that to choose between them using a
monetary scale is itself welfare-degrading. We then have secondorder considerations against CBA.
Why do I delineate the different grounds of incommensurability
in this manner? The distinction between esoteric and conventional
ordering failures is meant to reflect one important claim advanced
within the philosophical literature on incommensurability: the claim
that the trichotomy of conventional value relations does not exhaust
the ways in which options might relate and, in particular, that options
might be truly incomparable. 59 The distinction between first-order
and second-order considerations is meant to reflect a different, and
very interesting, claim: the claim that considerations of value or wellbeing might constrain the permissible attitudes that we have towards
options for choice. This is what Joseph Raz calls "constitutive incommensurability":
Certain judgments about the non-comparability of certain options and
certain attitudes to the exchangeability of options are constitutive of relations with friends, spouses, parents, etc. Only those who hold the view

58 See Chang, supra note 47, at 4 (discussing this conventional trichotomy).
These
are arguably conventional for only a subset of moral criteria, such as goodness-type, or
agent-neutral, criteria. The conventional relations for a rightness-type, or agentrelative, criterion might be: obliged, forbidden, permitted. Because overall well-being
is a goodness-type, agent-neutral criterion, I frame this discussion in terms of "better,"
"worse," and "equally good."
'9 See id. at 13-27 (surveying and criticizing arguments for incomparability).
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that friendship is neither better nor worse than money, but is simply not
comparable to money or other commodities are capable of having
friends. 6
The interesting and important possibility to consider here is that,
even if the numbers assigned by CBA to options do truly reflect how
the options fare with respect to overall well-being, the very beliefs,
thoughts, or judgments entailed by this scaling procedure are inconsistent with welfare in some way. There might be second-order, welfarist reason for citizens and agencies not to believe that a project
which saves a mountainside, or an endangered species, or the lives of
ten children, is worth $X for the welfare value of these goods just
might entail not believing that they have dollar equivalents.
These three grounds for incommensurability are exhaustive of the
welfarist objections to CBA. Any claim that options are incommensurable by CBA with respect to overall well-being must point to a conventional ordering failure, an esoteric ordering failure, second-order
6
considerations, or some combination thereof. ' In the remaining
parts of this Article, I will argue for the following view. Conventional
ordering failures are possible and, to some extent, actual, and where
they occur, they do indeed undermine CBA. Esoteric ordering failures also seem possible, but do not in fact undermine CBA. In short,
they are not a true ground of incommensurability, as surprising as
that may seem. Finally, second-order considerations also are possible,
but it is implausible that the second-order considerations weighing

RAZ, supra note 47, at 352. For similar claims within the incommensurability
literature, see ANDERSON, supra note 27, at 17-43; NUSSBAUM, supra note 27; RADIN,
supra note 27, at 83-94; Sunstein, supra note 24, at 782-95. For analogous claims within
the literature both criticizing and defending utilitarianism, see BRINK, supra note 13, at

273-83; Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism,and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 134, 148-64 (1984); Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical
Theories, 73J. PHIL. 453, 458-66 (1976); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 108-18 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds.,
1973). A more skeptical view is defended by KAGAN, supranote 21, at 357-69.

1 should stress that I focus here on the simple scenario of a choice by an agent
among given options. But even if a scaling procedure is best used by the agent, conditional on it being best that the agent choose among those particular options, it might
still be the case that (a) it is even better for the agent not to be choosing at all; or (b)
it is even better for the agent to be choosing from a different set of options. And to
the extent that CBA or another scaling procedure is used by agencies-not just in
choosing between fixed options, but in deciding whether to decide, or in generating
choice sets-then we have a different kind of incommensurability. But that is not the
kind I have space to discuss here. Cf GRIFFIN, supra note 28, at 85-86 (distinguishing
61

between incommensurability of value-types and incommensurability of value-tokens,
that is, options).
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against (justified) 62 CBA include the intrinsic second-order considerations described by Raz et al., and termed "constitutive incommensurability.,6

III. CONVENTIONAL ORDERING FAILURES
- In this Part, I will show why conventional ordering failures are a
possible feature of CBA. Given two or more options, it is possible that
CBA will assign numbers to the options that do not reflect how they
conventionally relate with respect to overall well-being. For simplicity, I will focus on the case where the agency only has two options:
the project and the status quo. By hypothesis, the project is, truly,
either better than, worse than, or precisely equal to the status quo
with respect to overall well-being. Yet on any reasonable theory of
well-being, it is possible that the number assigned by CBA to the project-the sum-of-CVs-does not reflect its true welfarist relation to the
status quo. This can happen in two ways, which I will discuss in turn.
First, the sum-of-CVs might just be undefined. A person's CV or welfare equivalent is the unique amount of money such that, if the person were to pay or be paid that sum of money along with the agency's
choice of the project, her well-being would be precisely the same as
her well-being under the status quo. It might be the case, however,
that no such unique amount exists; if so, that person's CV will be un-

"' On this caveat, see infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
Another large point must be raised here, if not satisfactorily resolved. The
choice between CBA and other ground-level decision procedures, for some options, is
a second-order choice made under uncertainty. The agent (or, more likely, the oversight body instructing her) must decide ex ante which ground-level decision procedure to use, without knowing with certainty how accurate the competing procedures
are (the degree of conventional ordering failure), how costly they are (the significance of second-order considerations), and so on. If the agent or oversight body knew
with certainty how accurate and costly the competing procedures were, the agent or
body would (presumably) know what option was the best; no ground-level decision
procedure would then be needed. Further, before making this second-order choice,
the agent or body must make the third-order determination how much information
about the second-order choice to elicit.
I have nothing insightful to say about how these higher-order choices are made.
On the topic, see generally Holly Smith, DecidingHow to Decide: Is There a Regress ProbLen?, in FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION THEORY 194 (Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley
eds., 1991). But the very distinction between moral criteria and decision procedures
means that my claims can be true and intelligible, independent of a resolution of the
higher-order choice problem. That is: (a) the best ground-level decision procedure
for the agent to use, in light of overall well-being, is that procedure the use of which
maximizes well-being, even if (b) it is unclear which higher-order procedure ought to
be employed to determine that.
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defined, and the sum-of-CVs will in turn be undefined. Second, even if
the sum-of-CVs is well-defined, that number may fail to track the effect of the project on overall well-being. For instance, the number
might be positive or zero where the project truly decreases overall
well-being, or it might be negative or zero where the project truly
improves overall well-being.
If and when conventional ordering failures occur, why does that
strengthen the welfarist case against CBA? Why, in short, are conventional ordering failures a true ground of incommensurability? The
answer is straightforward. If, in some choice situation before an
agency, the project is truly better or worse than the status quo, and yet
CBA orders the two options the wrong way (or as equal), or simply
fails to order them at all (because of undefined CVs), then that fact
counts against CBA and in favor of any decision procedure that orders the options correctly. Assume, first, that the other decision procedure is equal or better than CBA with respect to second-order
considerations, such as costs. Then it will be better, in light of overall
well-being, if the agency uses the other decision procedure instead of
CBA in this choice situation. Assume, next, that the other decision
procedure is worse than CBA with respect to second-order considerations. Then it still may be better for the agency to use that decision
the two
procedure instead of CBA, if the welfare difference between
64
large.
sufficiently
is
incorrectly
ranks
options that CBA
I say that conventional ordering failures are "possible," for CBA,
but do they actually arise in a significant way? Of the actual choice
situations that agencies face, to what extent do conventional ordering
failures actually occur? That depends on a lot: on what the right
theory of well-being is, on the types of options that reach agency
agendas, and on the ways in which these options would affect the wellbeing of the persons who gain or lose from them. Absent information about all this, it is hard to be definitive about the significance of
conventional ordering failures. But, as we shall see, it is at least plausible that conventional ordering failures actually occur in a significant
way.

, A further premise upon which I am relying here is that so-called "agent internalism," concerning the connection between morality and normative reason, holds true.
That is, the fact that some action is better for an agent, in light of a moral criterion
(which I am taking "overall well-being" to be), entails that (ceterisparibus) the agent has
normative reason to perform that action. See BRINK, supra note 13, at 37-43 (discussing
internalism, including agent internalism).
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A. Undefined Sum-of-CVs

1. Undefined CV
There are various reasons why the CV or welfare equivalent for
person P might be undefined-why, for a particular project, there
might not exist a unique monetary amount that precisely counterbalances the welfare effect of the project on P. Economists like to assume that P has a continuous, increasing function mapping dollar
payments to or from her in the project world onto a scale of her welfare (a "utility" scale),65 but on any reasonable theory of well-being
this might not occur. For example, the connection between money
and well-being might be partly nonincreasing-money might have a
marginal utility of zero for P, within some range of dollar payments.
If so, there might be a range of dollar payments such that any payment within this range precisely counterbalances the welfare effect of
the project on P. Or, the connection between money and well-being
might be discontinuous--theremight be no dollar amount that precisely counterbalances the project's welfare effect on P. Instead, for
dollar amounts less than a given amount, such payments plus the
project leave Pworse off than the status quo and, for dollar payments
of that amount or greater, such payments plus the project leave P
better off than the status quo.6 Both of these are surely possible, on
any reasonable theory of well-being: an objective-list theory, a desirebased theory, or a mental-state theory. On any reasonable theory,
money is not (or need not be) intrinsically valuable to P; rather, it is
(or may be) merely instrumentally valuable to P,insofar as it enables
P to purchase goods and services traded on markets. But nothing
guarantees that, if we give P one marginal dollar, the goods and services that P is thereby enabled to buy will improve her realization of
objective welfarist values (plausibly, values such as accomplishment,
deep personal relations, enjoyment, understanding, and autonomy);6
or will contribute to states of affairs that P desires (since P might be
indifferent between having those marginal goods and services, or

See BOADNWAY & BRUCE, supra note 11, at 33-43 (discussing utility and money);
DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 45-50, 81-83 (1990) (same).
For a discussion of the real extent of discontinuity and nonincreasingness, see
EdwardJ. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WIs. L. REV. 71,

99-105.
67 For plausible objective lists, see JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 85-90 (1980); GRIFFIN, supra note 28, at 67-68; GEORGE SHER, BEYOND
NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 199-201 (1997).
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not); or will produce better mental states for P. And when increasing
dollar payments do become large enough to make a welfare difference for P,this change might be a discrete rather than a continuous
change.
Yet another way in which, arguably, CVs might turn out to be uns I say "arguably" because it remains
defined involves incomparability.Y
controversial, among philosophers, whether incomparability is truly
possible. 69 But it surely seems possible. Raz argues for the possibility of
incomparability by pointing to the possibility of small improvements
with respect to the value of options that bear plural values:
Imagine that I am indifferent as between a walk in the park and a book
with a glass of Scotch at home. It is possible that though I will definitely
prefer (a) the book with a glass of port to (b) the book with Scotch, I am
indifferent as between either and (c)a walk in the park. This establishes
that I regard (a) and (c) as incommensurate. It seems plausible that
valuation of options allows for... incommensuranormally people's
70
bility of this sort.

We can use a similar strategy to construct possible scenarios in which,
it seems, dollar payments to persons harmed or benefited by projects
will make them neither better, nor worse, nor precisely as well off as
without the project. P is a nature-lover, who benefits from the wilderness area near her home; P also enjoys opera. Paying P $500, in return for a project that destroys the wilderness area, will enable her to
purchase a season's subscription at the opera in the cheapest seatsand this is neither better nor worse for P than the status quo. Paying
P larger amounts (up to, say, $1000) will enable her to purchase better and better opera seats, which will enhance her enjoyment of the
opera relative to the cheaper seats; yet, it seems that a season at the
opera in the best seats still might be neither better nor worse for P
than the status quo. Thus, it seems, dollar payments to P between
$500 and $1000, along with the project, might make her incomparably well off as compared to the status quo, and not precisely as well
off.

. For that matter, any kind of esoteric relation might give rise to undefined CVs.
If well-being is vague-if it can be neither true nor false that options are better, worse,
or equally good with respect to well-being-then a person's CV might be undefined by
virtue of vagueness. In this Article, I focus on incomparability. See infra notes 93-95
and accompanying text (defining incomparability).
69 See Chang, supra note 47, at 13-27 (surveying and criticizing arguments for incomparability).
70RAZ, supra note 47, at 328.
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Finally, a person's CV might be undefined because of lexical priority. By this I mean the following: If P loses from a project, any dollar
payment to P along with the project still leaves her worse off than the
status quo, and if P gains from a project, any dollar payment from P
(out of the resources available to her) still leaves her better off than
the status quo. Lexical priorities are obviously possible on any reasonable theory of well-being. Consider projects that cause death to P
where Pis a loser from the project (i.e., P's life in the status quo is not
so bad that death is a good thing for her). On any reasonable theory
of well-being, it is possible and, I think, highly plausible that, for this
kind of project, no dollar payment to P (specifically, to P's estate)
along with the project would suffice to make P as well off as with the
status quo. For it is highly plausible and surely possible that nothing
P's heirs or anyone else can do with the money in P's estate, after P's
death, can improve P's well-being.7'
Now, the welfarist defender of CBA will likely respond to these
various scenarios, in which no precise welfare equivalent for P exists,
by developing a new construct (call it the CV*) that is more or less
closely related to the construct of a welfare equivalent, and that will
be well-defined. For example, to deal with the possibility of a nonincreasing connection between money and welfare, the welfarist might
define P's CV* as, say, the smallest amount sufficient to compensate
precisely P's loss (if P is a loser) or the largest amount required to
balance precisely her gain (if Pis a winner).7 To deal with the added
possibility of a discontinuous connection between money and welfare,
the welfarist might define P's CV* as, say, the smallest amount sufficient either to compensate precisely or to overcompensate P's loss (if
P is a loser) or, failing that, the lower limit of the amounts that precisely compensate or overcompensate P's loss-and symmetrically if P
is a winner. To deal with the added possibility of dollar payments that
leave P incomparably well off, the welfarist might define P's CV* as,
say, the smallest amount sufficient either to compensate precisely P,
or to overcompensate P, or to leave her incomparably well off (if P is a
loser) or, failing that, the lower limit of the amounts that precisely
compensate, overcompensate, or leave P incomparably well off-and

7' For discussions of the welfare of the dead, see GRIFFIN, supra note 28, at 22-23;
SUMNER, supra note 34, at 125-27.
72 See MIsHAN, supra note 29, at 183 ("With respect to the opportunity of acquiring

a particular good, there are then, in general, two alternative sums to be considered: a
maximum sum he will pay to have the good and a minimum sum he will accept to
forgo it.").
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symmetrically if P is a winner. Finally, in order to deal with projects
that involve lexical priorities, among some portion of the affected
population, the welfarist might redefine a person's CV* for this kind
of project as her CV for the risk that the project will go through.
A person's CV*, unlike her CV, will (or may be) well-defined. But
the upshot may be that CBA*, defined as the sum-of-CV*s, fails to
track overall well-being. CBA* may end up assigning positive numbers to welfare-degrading projects, or negative numbers to welfareimproving ones-and this may, in part, be a result of the very facts
about money and well-being by virtue of which CVs are undefined.
To see the problem in a simple way, imagine that the connection
between money and well-being, for the winners and losers from a
project, is as follows. A payment of any amount from $0 up to but not
including $5 makes no difference to a loser's welfare, and a payment
of any amount from $5 to $15 improves her welfare by one unit of
overall well-being. Symmetrically, a deduction of any amount from $0
up to but not including $5 makes no difference to a winner's welfare,
and a deduction of any amount from $5 to $15 decreases her welfare
by one interpersonal unit. There are three persons affected by the
project: two losers, who each incur a one unit loss in interpersonal
welfare units, and one winner, who gains by one unit. Therefore, the
project degrades overall well-being. But the winner's CV* is $15,
while each of the loser's CV*s is $5. Thus, the sum of CV*s is positive,
which (incorrectly) signals that the project is welfare-improving.7
Does the possible phenomenon I have just described-in which
undefined CVs force a redefinition of the compensating variation,
such that cost-benefit balancing thus redefined fails to track overall
well-being-actually arise in a significant fraction of choice situations
before agencies? At least in the case of lexical priority, it plausibly
does. Agencies often must evaluate "projects" that involve incremental deaths relative to the status quo. This is routinely the case for
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
that regulate, respectively, the constituents of foods and drugs, the
safety of workplaces, the level of environmental pollutants, and the
73 In this case, the problem might be solved by defining a CV** as the midpoint of
the range of amounts that compensate someone, but accurately determining that
number might be expensive and difficult. In short, the trade-off between CV* and

GV** here is a trade-off between conventional ordering failures and second-order
considerations.
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design of automobiles. 74 The now-standard approach to cost-benefit
balancing, for these kinds of projects, is to determine the incremental
risk of death that the projects create among the affected population,
and then to aggregate the CVs for that risk.7 An initial objection to
this procedure might be that a person's "risk" from the project is itself
undefined: If the world is deterministic, the person will either die, or
not. This initial difficulty is probably surmountable through some
epistemic construct. For example, we might say that P's incremental
"risk" from the project is the incremental risk she would estimate
given the epistemic effort that is optimal or reasonable for her, in
light of her well-being. 6 But even if P's welfare equivalent for the
incremental "risk" from the project to her is well-defined, there is a
plausible-indeed powerful-argument that the sum-of-CV*s (CVs
for risk) is a woefully inadequate tool for measuring the effect on
overall well-being of death-causing projects. AsJohn Broome writes:
Consider any project in which an unknown person will die. Because
whoever it is does not know it will be him, because of his ignorance, he

is prepared to accept a ridiculously low compensation for letting the
project go forward. The government does not know who will be killed
either, but it knows it will be someone, and it knows that, whoever it is,
for him.7
no finite amount of compensation would be adequate

To put Broome's point most starkly: P's welfare equivalent for the
incremental risk of her death is not merely "ridiculously low," it
should be zero. Plausibly, risk as such does not constitute a welfare
setback for persons; only death (or the fear of death) does. 78 But
clearly if the CV for the risk of death is zero or "ridiculously low,"
then the sum-of-CV*s will not track the welfare effect of death-causing
projects.'
7' See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECnVE RISK
REGULATION 3-29 (1993) (undertaking a critical survey of risk regulatory programs).
71 SeeVISCUSI, supranote 12, at 17-33 (describing this methodology).
76 See generally Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 322-29 (David Owen ed., 1995) (discussing the na-

ture of risk in a deterministic universe).
7 John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9J. PUB. ECON. 91, 95
(1978).
78 See Perry, supranote 76, at 330-39 (arguing that risk is not harm).

71 Much more needs to be said here. Although P's welfare equivalent for risk is
plausibly zero, her ex ante egoistic willingness to pay to avoid the risk is not. It is
rational for P, in her own interest, to pay to avoid a risk that (unbeknownst to her) will
not eventuate. Assuming that P's willingness to pay conforms to expected-utility theory, seeRESNIK, supranote 49, at 88-100 (describing the expected-utility theory), then it

can be argued that aggregating ex ante egoistic willingness to pay to avoid risk, across
the population at risk, is, in turn, a rough measure of the welfare loss that will result
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The plausible claim here is not that death-causing projects necessarily degrade welfare. Rather, the plausible claim is that cost-benefit
balancing, whether defined as the sum-of-compensating-variations-fordeath or the sum-of-compensating-variations-for-the-risk-of-death, fails
to track the effect of death-causing projects on overall welfare. To
quote Broome once more:
[I] magine trying to perform a compensation test with roses as medium
instead of money. People cannot be compensated with roses for any
major loss. Therefore, according to this method, rather a lot of projects
would have an infinite cost. Nevertheless many of them could still be
improvements (as we might be able to find out by recalculating their
values in terms of money). The point is that roses are an inadequate
measure for big costs and benefits. Money is a more powerful measuring instrument, but even the measuring rod of money is not long
enough to encompass life and death.80
A person's CV for death is undefined, and although her CV* for
death is well-defined, the sum-of-CV*s is, plausibly, uncorrelated with
whether the death-causing project improves or degrades overall wellbeing.
2. Baseline Dependence
I have been discussing one straightforward way in which the scaling procedure called CBA may fail to assign a definite number to an
agency's project: The CV for some individual person, her welfare
equivalent for the project relative to the status quo, may turn out to
be undefined. If so, the sum-of-CVs for that project in turn will be
undefined. Yet there is another quite interesting way in which the
number assigned by CBA to a project can be undefined even if every
individual has a well-defined CV for that project.
That possibility arises because a person's CV is baseline dependent.
Someone's CV-for-the-project, relative to the status quo (the amount
that, paid to or from her in the project world, makes her just as well
off as in the status quo world) need not be the same as her CV-for-the-

from the risk-creating deaths. But there are also nonmonetized measures of that. See
Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 118, 119-21 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994) (describing the Qualy approach to measuring the welfare effect of death and illness).
so Broome, supra note 77, at 96. For a defense of the claim that welfarist gains in
other dimensions (for example, leisure, recreation, education) can outweigh the
welfare loss of lost lives, see Alastair Norcross, ComparingHarms: Headaches and Human
Lives, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 135 (1997).
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status-quo, relative to the project (the amount that, paid to or from
her in the status quo world, makes her just as well off as in the project
world). As a result, it may turn out that (a) the sum-of-GVs-for-theproject is negative, and the sum-of-CVs-for-the-status-quo is also negative, that is, from each world it looks as if the other is worse; or (b)
the sum-of-GVs-for-the-project is positive and the sum-of-CVs-for-thestatus-quo is positive, that is, from each world it looks as if the other is
better."
The problem of baseline dependence has been long discussed in
the economics literature. The deviation between a given person's CVfor-the-project and her CV-for-the-status-quo, and in turn the conflict
between aggregate CVs from each baseline, may arise because (1) as
economists have emphasized, prices simply may be different in the
project and status quo worlds, or (2) although prices are the same, a
person may convert purchased goods and services into well-being at
different rates in the two worlds.n Neither (1) nor (2) presupposes a
commitment to a particular theory of well-being, and so picking a
particular theory will not solve the problem.
Why not simply stipulate that the status quo is the unique baseline
for purposes of CBA? The answer is this: There is nothing in CBA
itself that distinguishes the "status quo" option from "project" options. The sum-of-compensating-variations methodology says only,
"from a given baseline, evaluate costs and benefits for other options";
it does not further specify which baseline to pick. Perhaps there are
some nonwelfarist criteria, such as deontological criteria, that pick
out the "status quo" world as the true status quo for purposes of these
criteria (say, because the agency is much less active there, relative to
the "project" world). sa Yet CBA is not meant to track how the
"project" fares with respect to these nonwelfarist criteria; it is meant
to track whether it improves overall well-being. Perhaps, too, there is
some welfarist sense in which the "status quo" world is truly the status
8' See Blackorby & Donaldson, supra note 10, at 487-88 (noting that CBA produces

reversals). For an overview of empirical work on the baseline dependence of individual CVs, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness
to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
82 For a discussion of the point that Scitovsky reversals and the like can result from
preference shifts, as well as from wealth effects given constant preferences, see generally Cowen, supra note 35.
8
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra note 7, pt. III.A.1 ("The benefits
and costs of each alternative must be measured against a baseline [which] should be
the best assessment of the way the world would look absent the proposed regulation.").
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quo. This point, however, is not helpful in specifying how to perform
CBA, because CBA is meant to serve as a decision procedure that
agencies can employ insteadof the direct application of welfarist criteria.
The CBA analyst might simply flip a coin to define the status quo,
but if the ranking of options from this baseline differs from the ranking from other baselines, why should we conclude that the analysis
has captured the true effect of the options on overall well-being? The
better approach, for CBA, is this: Take each option, in turn, as a
baseline and then pick the option with the highest number if the rank84
ing of all the optionsfrom each baseline is the same, and, if not, use a different decision procedure entirely (for example, the direct
application of the welfare criterion). But as I have just explained, in
the simple case of two options, and a fortiori when agencies are offered more than two options, the ranking of all the options from each
baseline need not be the same. In this important sense, CBA can
turn out to be undefined even if individual CVs are well-defined for
every option from every baseline.
B. PoorTracking
One way in which CBA can fail to represent how options truly relate, with respect to overall well-being-where, by hypothesis, the
options are truly ordered by the trichotomy of conventional ordering
relations-is where CBA fails to assign definite numbers to the options. The other way in which CBA can fail to represent how options
truly relate, with respect to overall well-being-on the same hypothesis-is where the definite numbers assigned to options do not correspond to their true, conventional relations. Call this "poor tracking."
I already have discussed poor tracking in connection with CBA*, but
let me say a bit more here. Because it is straightforward to see why
poor tracking is both possible and plausibly actual, my discussion will
be relatively brief. This brevity is meant to signal the intuitiveness of
the problem, not its insignificance.
Imagine that the connection between money and well-being is as
welfare economists like to imagine: There is an increasing, continuous function that goes through the origin, and that maps dollar payments to or from P along with the project onto changes in a cardinal
scale (the "utility" scale) of P's well-being. Thus, assuming no lexical
84 Or a bit more weakly:

same.

if the top-ranked option from all the baselines is the
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priority, each P affected by the project has a unique welfare equivalent. Further, assume that the project is given a well-defined ranking,
relative to the status quo, by CBA.ss Finally, to make the illustration
simple, assume that utility differences are interpersonally comparable.
Each person's utility scale is not just a scale of her well-being but a
scale of overall well-being, such that the project increases or decreases
overall well-being relative to the status quo just in case the sum of
individual utility differences for that change is, respectively, positive
86
or negative.
In this scenario, how can poor tracking arise? Very simply. Unless every person has the same function connecting money and utility
for a given project and status quo, and that function is a straight line,
the sum-of-CVs for the project can deviate from the sum of utility
differences. It can deviate if winners and losers from the project have
different functions. Or, it can deviate if every person has the same
function and yet-because the function is not a straight line-dollars
are translated into interpersonal welfare at different rates, along different parts of the function.
On any reasonable theory of well-being, it is possible that winners
and losers have different functions connecting money and utility, for
a given project and status quo. Take first an objective-list theory. On
this theory, it is possible, indeed probable, that the contribution of
money to personal and interpersonal well-being decreases as a person's stock of wealth increases. As Thomas Hurka explains, within
the context of an Artistotelian theory:
For modest perfection . .. one needs enough resources for material
security and a basic education. On its own ...this fact does not amount
to diminishing marginal utility. However important it is to move from
zero resources to the minimum, it could be equally important to move
from there to twice the minimum. But this is unlikely given the nature
of Artistotelian perfection.... Of the many routes to excellence, many
are quite undemanding of resources. Consider the artistic and scholarly
lives.... [T]hey hardly require great personal fortunes, nor do lives de-

voted to chess, athletics, or personal relations.... Past a point [wealth]

That is, the sum-of-CVs-for-the-project has a different sign, positive or negative,
than the sum-of-CVs-for-the-status-quo; or both the sum-of-CVs-for-the-project and the
sum-of-CVs-for-the-status-quo are zero.
SeeJohn A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-SenDebate on Utilitarianism,
in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 14, at 255, 299-305 (1991)
(distinguishing between interpersonally comparable and noncomparable utility functions).
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number of a person's options but will not add greatly to
can increase the
7
their quality.8
It is also possible that the contribution of money to well-being differs
between equally wealthy persons, insofar as money is differentially
productive of the value that each is best poised to realize. I am a
scholar, while you are a traveller; money can do very little beyond a
certain point to help my scholarly pursuits, while it can do quite a lot
to facilitate your travel.
Similar points apply, mutatis mutandis, to desire-based theories.
People typically, or at least possibly, develop desires for states of affairs in virtue of the objective values they take those states to realize.8
If indeed each person's desire for a state roughly tracks the degree to
which she realizes an objective value in that state, and if persons are
differentially poised to convert money into objective' values, then
money will
89 be differentially productive of desire-satisfaction across
persons. Finally, and clearly, differing functions are possible on a
mental-state theory: either a Sidgwickian theory which makes welfare
depend on desirable mental states (the objective-list story I have just
told can be retold here, insofar as, say, P desires the experience of
friendship, accomplishment, autonomy, and other objective values)
or a Benthamite theory which makes welfare depend on pleasurable
sensations (if, for example, "resource monsters" efficiently convert
purchased goods and services into pleasure, while "resource misers"
are less efficient). 0
What if, remarkably, winners and losers from the project do have
the same function connecting money and utility? In that event, it is
quite possible that the function will not be a straight line. Just as rich
and poor persons may benefit differentially from equal dollar payments, so large dollar payments to the same person need not produce
a benefit proportional to that of small payments.

THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 171 (1993).
83 See GRIFFIN, supra note 28, at 26-31 (noting that people typically desire what they

take to be valuable); Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of InterpersonalComparison.; in
INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 14, at 17, 24-25 (same).

This statement assumes that there is some concept of desire-satisfaction that is
interpersonally comparable. For a survey of possibilities, see Daniel M. Hausman, The
Impossibility of InterpersonalUtility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995). I am not suggesting here that differential realization of desired values is the only way that poor tracking
can arise within a desire-based theory, simply that it is one way.
9oSeeSUMNER, supra note 34, at 83-92 (distinguishing between two types of mental89

state theories).
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Here, as with undefined CVs and sum-of-GVs, I have focused
mainly on the possibility of poor tracking without making stronger
claims about its actual significance. That significance depends on the
actual nature of agency projects, the actual shape of functions connecting money and utility, and so forth. But there is at least one actual and significant case, other than the risk/death example already
discussed, in which CBA plausibly fails to track the welfare effect of
agency and legislative projects. That is the case of projects that involve transferpayments from rich to poor. Such transfers plausibly will
increase overall well-being, without more, because, as I have just explained, it is plausible (and usually assumed) that the poor reap
9
greater well-being from dollars than the rich, ceteris paribus.' Yet a
counted by CBA as no
transfer payment, without more, is notoriously
92
improvement whatsoever over the status quo.
IV. ESOTERIC ORDERING FAILURES
Let us now consider a different (arguable) source of incommensurability: esoteric ordering failures. By this I mean, again, that the
numbers assigned to options by CBA do not represent how the options truly relate with respect to overall well-being, insofar as options are
related by esotericvalue relationsother than the conventional trichotomy (better
than, worse than, precisely equal). In this Part, I will defend the following claim: It may be possible that esoteric ordering failures occur, but
they are not, in truth, a ground of incommensurability, at least where
the esoteric ordering relation at hand is incomparability. The fact that
CBA fails to represent how incomparable options relate, for an agent,
does not count against the agent's use of CBA in a choice situation
involving those options, and in favor of some other decision procedure. In particular, given a choice situation in which all options are
mutually incomparable, the question whether an agent has (normative) reason to use CBA in that situation is wholly dependent on second-order considerations. Further, as we shall see, the incomparability of options does not entail the existence of second-order

diminishing
" See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 8, at 85, 201 (describing
marginal interpersonal utility of wealth as plausible).
' See, e.g., EDwARD M. GRAMLIcH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 63 (2d ed.

1990) (explaining that transfer payments "should be netted out" in a cost-benefit
analysis).
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considerations (in particular, attitudinal constraints) that might
weigh against CBA.9s
Two options are incomparable with respect to welfare, or more
generally with respect to a normative criterion, if the following obtains: (1) for each option, it is false that this option is better than the
other, with respect to the criterion, and it is false that this option is
worse than the other, with respect to the criterion, such that (2) it is
false that, in light of the criterion, there is reason to choose either
option over the other, and yet (3) it is also false that the options are
precisely equal, with respect to the criterion, for example because
there exists a third option which is better than one of the two and still
neither better nor worse than the other. 4 Incomparability may not
be the only kind of esoteric value relation. Perhaps there are others,
such as vague value relations.9s However, because the philosophical
literature on incommensurability, insofar as it has discussed esoteric
value relations, has to date mainly focused on incomparability, that
will be my focus here.
To begin, let me distinguish between global and local incomparability. By "global incomparability," I mean that two agency options
will be incomparable with respect to overall well-being as long as
someone is better off with one option, and someone else is better off
with the other. Global incomparability says that well-being cannot be
compared across persons. To put the claim in the language of economics, it says that where two options are Pareto-incomparable, they

93There might be a contingent connection, short of entailment, between
esoteric
ordering failures and the true grounds of incommensurability-I will not speculate on
that issue-but, in any event, it is just those latter facts, and not esoteric failures, that
must obtain for the agent to have reason not to use CBA.
9'See RAZ, supra note 47, at 322-35 (defining incomparability this way). Ruth
Chang offers a different definition. See Chang, supra note 47, at 4-7, 6 ("[T]wo items
are incomparable with respect to a covering value if, for every positive value relation
relativized to that covering value, it is not true that it holds between them." (emphasis
omitted)). My definition of incomparability, following Raz, excludes vagueness and
includes what Chang calls "parity," see id. at 25-27, at least if it is true that, with options
on par with one another, no reason exists to choose one option over the other.
Chang's definition, on the other hand, excludes parity but includes vagueness.
" Options are vaguely related with respect to the trichotomy if it is neither true nor
false that the options are better, worse, or precisely equal. See GRIFFIN, supra note 28,
at 95-98 (discussing vagueness); RAZ, supra note 47, at 324 (same); Chang, supra note
47, at 4-5 (same). The temptation to conflate vagueness and incomparability (as I
have defined it here) should be avoided. If options are incomparable, then it is false
that there is a reason to pick one or the other; if options are vaguely related, then it is
neither true nor false that there is such a reason.
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are welfare-incomparable. 6 Global incomparability would be absolutely devastating for GBA. We do not need to monetize and aggregate a project's costs and benefits, relative to some baseline, if the
project has no costs or no benefits relative to that baseline. CBA is a
technique for evaluating projects that have both welfare costs and
welfare benefits. The most plausible defense of CBA says that, for
projects of this kind, which are left unranked by the standard of Pareto-superiority, CBA is a good decision procedure for identifying
those that increase overall well-being. If, in fact, the criterion of overall well-being runs outjust at the point where Pareto-superiority does,
9
this welfarist defense of CBA collapses.
Fortunately, for the defender of GBA, global incomparability is
false. If I can use a scarce medical instrument or procedure to relieve
serious asthma, and you can use it to relieve a slight itch, then we are
better off overall if I get the instrument or procedure, even if you
neither care nor even know about me and therefore giving the procedure or instrument to me is truly a (slight) welfare setback for you.
If I am an artist, who needs the amber hues of the sludge-colored
river beneath my studio as inspiration for the abstract art I create, and
you are my neighbors, whose lives are shortened or seriously discomforted by the chemicals that make the water amber, then overall welfare improves if we clean the water up, despite the harm to my artistic
interests. Indeed, global incomparability is not merely false, but impossible on any reasonable theory of well-being. For a theory of wellbeing to be reasonable, it is a necessary condition that it warrant some
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. As Daniel Hausman explains: "[IHf a conception of well-being does not permit one to make
interpersonal comparisons in an acceptable way, then that conception
98
of well-being is itself unacceptable." It is a platitude about welfare
that sometimes we can compare small losses or gains to one person
with large gains or losses to another, and conclude that overall welfare has improved or decreased even though the welfare-changing
move is not a true Pareto-improvement or the opposite.9 Any rea-

By "Pareto-incomparable," I mean just that at least one person is better off with
one option, and at least one other person is better off with the other option.

"' It bears emphasis, however, that global incomparability is devastating for CBA as
a second-order matter (because CBA is presumably costly, and these costs are wasted if
all options are incomparable) and not as a first-order matter.
" Hausman, supra note 89, at 474.
99See id. at 489 ("[I]nterpersonal comparisons are an ineliminable part of human
life."); see also John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in
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sonable theory of well-being will need to bear out this platitude, and
rule out global incomparability.
This leaves local incomparability. By "local incomparability," I
mean that some (not all) options will be incomparable, where they
are Pareto-incomparable.
Unlike global incomparability, local incomparability seems possible. It is not ruled out by our platitudes
about welfare; it is a platitude that "large enough" welfare changes for
one person will outweigh "trivial" changes in the opposite direction
for that person or another, not that any welfare change for one person is comparable with any welfare change in the opposite direction
for that person or another. Moreover, as I have already noted, Joseph
Raz has constructed examples involving small improvements with
respect to plural values-his port, scotch, and park example from The
Morality of Freedomn--that appear to be cases of true welfare incomparability. 00 Of course, we do not use CBA to decide whether a single
individual should spend the afternoon drinking port, drinking
scotch, or walking in the park. But it is easy, following Raz's lead, to
imagine a case in which options that CBA might be used to evaluate
seem to be truly welfare-incomparable.
Local Incomparability: Strolling or Sports

A large tract of land at the edge of town can be put to one of two uses.
It can be turned into a lovely park, with quiet, shaded paths for strolling,
or it can be developed into an athletic facility, with areas for mountainbiking, skateboarding, in-line skating, and running. Half of the town's
population are recreational walkers; half are recreational bikers, skateboarders, etc. Each group desires its respective recreation with the same
distribution of intensity (whatever "intensity" of desire means for purposes of interpersonal comparison), and the feelings of satisfaction produced by each recreation are roughly the same for each group.
Adding an extra biking trail, or a better skateboard area, to the proposed athletic facility would make it even better than the originally proposed facility. Yet neither the proposed facility, nor the improved
proposed facility, seems better or worse than the proposed park. (After
all, both strolling and sports are valuable kinds of recreation. Nothing
in the objective values at"stake seems to warrant our counting either of
the athletic facilities as a welfare improvement over the park, or vice

39, 49 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982)
(noting pervasiveness of interpersonal utility comparisons in ordinary life).
tooSee HuRKA, supra note 87, at 86-88 (stating in effect that local, but not global,
incomparability will obtain with respect to human perfection); AMARTYA SEN,
INEQuALriY REEXAMINED 46-48 (1992) (same, with respect to "functionings" and
"capabilities").
UTILUTARIANISM AND BEYOND
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versa.) Thus, seemingly, the park and the athletic facilities are incomparable with respect to overall well-being.

It might be argued that the appearance of incomparability, in this
case or in Raz's port, scotch, and park example, is misleading.
Donald Regan, for instance, maintains that the trichotomy of conventional value relations normally exhausts the ways in which options
relate.' O' Normally, if not necessarily, for Regan, if two options are
not better or worse, then they are precisely equal. The appearance of
incomparability, he argues, does not reflect an esoteric relation beyond better, worse, and precisely equal, but more typically results
from the ignorance of choosers about which of the three conventional relations the options bear. 11 I need not take a position on the
Regan-Raz dispute here, for the claim I wish to defend is that, even if
local incomparability is possible, it does not undermine CBA.
Why not? Consider first the case in which CBA fails to provide a
numerical ranking of two options. As I have already explained, this
may occur for various reasons: because the CV for one or more persons is undefined, or because, even given well-defined CVs for all
persons, each option looks better or worse from the baseline of the
other. The case when CBA does not provide a numerical ranking, it
should be stressed, is not an esoteric ordering failure. An esoteric
ordering failure means that the numbers assigned by CBA to options
(or, in this case, the absence of a numerical ranking) fail to reflect
how the options truly relate. The numerical ranking (or absence
thereof) produced by the scaling procedure is not an accurate representation of the true relations betveen the options, with respect to
the governing criterion (here, overall well-being). That is what I
mean by the term "ordering failure." But, if two options are truly
incomparable, and CBA does not assign the options a numerical

'0' See Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz' ;Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1056-67 (1989).
" See id. Regan at one point "conced[es] that incommensurable values are logically possible" but also says that "all values are commensurable." Id. at 1056.
My discussion here is based exclusively on Regan's original work on comparability.
His more recent defense of comparability is contained in Donald Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRAGTICAL REASON, supra note 47, at 129. This important treatment was published too late to be
incorporated into my Article, but should certainly be consulted by any reader interested in incomparability, as should the other contributions to Professor Chang's volume, and the contributions to this Symposium. See Matthew Adler, Law and
Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998) (summarizing discussions of incomparability by Symposium participants).
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ranking, then this absence of a numerical ranking accurately reflects
how the options truly relate! In other words, if options are incomparable,
then any numerical ranking of them would be a poor representation
because numbers (or at least real numbers) are necessarily ordered as
greater, lesser, or precisely equal. Conversely, the absence of a numerical ranking for incomparable options just reflects that they bear a
fourth relation which no real-valued scale can mirror.
It might be objected that, in the case where options are incomparable and CBA fails to assign them a numerical ranking, there is welfarist reason against using CBA-for there is welfarist reason to use a
decision procedure that, unlike CBA here, reaches a determinate
choice: "Normally, it is a good thing from the point of view of overall
welfare for agents or agencies to choose determinately between options, rather than to dither. CBA, to the extent it fails to assign a determinate ranking to options, leaves agents or agencies dithering."
This objection is cogent. Dithering is often costly and, at a minimum,
just silly; normally, we do indeed have welfarist reason not to dither.'0 3
But that welfarist reason is a second-order, not a first-order reason. It
is a reason which obtains even if, as in the case now considered, options are truly incomparable and CBA accurately reflects that fact. In
any event, the problem of dithering is readily solved in the kind of
case we are now considering. Simply stipulate that, where CBA fails
to assign determinate numbers to options, the status quo is chosen
(assuming some option is determinately picked out as the status quo
by deontological criteria) or, failing that, a coin is flipped. This procedure may be objectionable, but only in cases of conventional ordering failure, or when second-order considerations obtain beyond the
principle against dithering, such as second-order constraints on attitudes-and not merely in the case of incomparable options.
Now, let us move to the case in which CBA does assign a determinate, numerical ranking to the two options and yet they are truly incomparable. Here, we do have an esoteric ordering failure. The
project, say, is assigned a positive sum-of-CVs from the baseline of the
status quo, and the status quo is assigned a negative sum-of-CVs from
the baseline of the project, and yet, in truth, the project is neither
better, nor worse, nor precisely equal to the status quo. But so what?
103 Of course, we have reason to dither where something more might be learned

about the options; but in the case of incomparable options, there is nothing left to
learn. SeeRegan, supra note 101, at 1062-64, 1063 (stating that "deliberating [between
two incomparable options] beyond the point where the relevance of practical reason
has been exhausted.., makes no sense").
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The existence of an esoteric ordering failure does not wholly or partly
constitute a normative reason for the agent to use some other decision procedure here instead of CBA. Consider a decision procedure
that, in this case, determinately picks out the status quo rather than
the project. That alternative decision procedure is not better, qua
welfare, than CBA. Rather, it is incomparable,so far as we yet know.
Where procedure D1 picks out 01, and procedure D2 picks out 02,
and 01 and 02 are welfare-incomparable, then D1 and D2 are also
incomparable, insofar as their welfare value depends on the welfare
value of the options they pick out. To demonstrate that a welfarist
reason exists in favor of procedure D2, we would need to point to the
fact that D2, but not D1, correctly ranks other options that are not incomparable; or to the fact that D1 violates second-order constraints
on the permissible attitudes that choosers adopt; or to further secondorder considerations. 04
The point bears emphasis: CBA is, without more, neither better
nor worse than any alternative decision procedure that determinately
picks out an option that is incomparable from the option picked out
by CBA. To be sure, CBA is not precisely equal to the alternative decision procedure. This absence of precise equality, however, does not
entail the existence of a welfarist reason pro or con CBA. Again, incomparability just means that there is no reason in favor of one option or the other. The absence of precise equality may have other
entailments (for example, that for some choice situation there will be
a third decision procedure better than CBA, but incomparable to the
alternative), but specifically not the entailment that a reason exists in

favor of one incomparable procedure or the other.
What about the procedural option of dithering? Where CBA determinately picks out a project that is truly welfare-incomparable with
the status quo, one alternative procedure (an incomparable one) is a
procedure that determinately picks out the status quo; another alternative procedure is a procedure that picks out neither option, but
leaves the agent or agency dithering. Note that the argument I have
just adduced does not prove CBA to be incomparable with the dithering alternative. For dithering, by definition, picks out neither of the
two options, and our premise is that the two options are incomparable to each other, not that they are incomparable with the third op" The same holds true for a decision procedure that, like CBA, picks out the
project but does so in a way that accurately reflects the incomparability of the project
and the status quo. Without more, the agent has no reason to choose this decision
procedure over CBA.
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tion of dithering. Yet as I already have argued, there is normally welfarist reason not to dither. CBA thus is not incomparable with the
dithering option; rather, it is better, at least normally. To be sureand this is why I say "normally"-there may be welfarist reason to
dither rather than engage in CBA when CBA, but not dithering, violates constraints on permissible attitudes. If I am trying to decide
whether to spend the holidays with my birth family or my adoptive
family, then monetizing and comparing the well-being I would receive under each option may be an inappropriate way to think about
the choice. As compared to that, or any decisive procedure, a little
dithering might be better, even if the options are incomparable. But
it is a large mistake to think that the incomparability of options always
brings into play second-order constraints that would bar thinking
about options in monetary terms. Incomparability is neither sufficient nor necessary for the existence of such constraints-assuming
they exist, a point to be considered in Part V. Incomparability is not
necessary, since if there is reason, for example, not to think about
friends, or children, or mountains in monetary terms, then surely this
reason does not evaporate if the option of losing the friend, child, or
mountain is not merely incomparable with the option of keeping the
friend, child, or mountain, but is truly worse! More importantly for
our purposes, the incomparability of options is not plausibly sufficient
for monetization to constitute an inappropriate attitude. Incomparability, if it exists, is logically distinct from, and can exist without, second-order constraints on monetization.
Consider again Raz's port, scotch, and park example, ' °s or my example of strolling versus sports."6 What drives the (seeming) incomparability in these cases is the existence of plural values, and the
possibility of small improvements in one without apparent change
overall. But if the values are not constrained, such that thinking
about them in welfare or monetary terms is destructive of their goodness-and why think recreational values are like that?-we have
(apparent) incomparability without relevant attitudinal constraints.
"Incommensurability" meaning incomparability-that is, the absence
of reason for choice-is quite distinct from "incommensurability"
meaning the existence of reason not to think about choices in a certain
way. It is now time to consider whether "incommensurability," in this
last sense, really arises.

105See supra text accompanying note 70.

106See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
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V. SECOND-ORDER CONSIDERATIONS
"Second-order considerations" are a residual category. Any welfarist consideration against an agent's use of CBA for choosing between
given options, other than an esoteric or conventional ordering failure, is a second-order consideration. For example, in a given choice
situation, imagine that an agency's options are ordered by the conventional trichotomy of better than, worse than, or precisely equal.
Further, suppose that CBA, if properly executed, both is well-defined
and tracks perfectly the true welfare order of the options. Thus there
are no first-order considerations against the use of CBA in this situation. Nonetheless, Congress or a presidential oversight agency might
have a legitimate welfarist reason to countermand the agency's use of
CBA here. CBA might be too expensive, or its application might be
sufficiently opaque that it invites agency shirking and malfeasance,
relative to another, more clear-cut decision procedure that, for these
07
These kinds of
options, tracks overall well-being sufficiently well.'
of yet more
in
favor
tell
which
CBA,
against
welfarist considerations
algorithmic procedures and which concern the epistemic imperfections of agencies, the relative time and effort involved by CBA, the
risk of a deliberate or negligent misapplication of that procedure, and
so forth, comprise-by my categorization-various kinds of "secondorder" considerations. It is quite plausible that, to some extent, such
considerations obtain, and in no way do I intend to deny that.
Rather, the position I wish to defend in this Part is that there is no
intrinsic second-order welfarist consideration that does robust moral
work against the use of CBA. The monetization of costs and benefits-even the costs and benefits of destroying mountains, killing
children, ruining marriages or friendships, and harming other supposedly priceless goods-is not an intrinsic disvalue, sufficient to override CBA where CBA is otherwise justified. The plausible secondorder considerations I have just described do not purport to identify
some intrinsic disvalue in CBA. To say that CBA invites agency shirking or malfeasance, or that it consumes an agency's time and effort, is
to identify some further welfare setback (the welfare-degrading projects that a shirking agency approves, the options that the consumed
'07 What would that more algorithmic procedure be? It would not be a procedure
of straight moral deliberation-which is even less algorithmic than CBA-but it might
be a procedure of, say, imposing controls on firms up to the point of "technological
feasibility," or banning all risks above a "de minimis" threshold, or permitting activities
that satisfy existing trade or professional standards. See generally LAVE, supra note 1, at
9-25 (discussing these procedures).

1410

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVEW

[Vol.146:1371

resources could be used to promote) with which CBA is, contingently,
connected. By contrast, what I take Raz to be claiming in his discussion of "constitutive incommensurability""°8 is that monetization can
be intrinsically disvaluable-specifically, that P's very thought, belief,
or judgment that certain goods have monetary equivalents is inconsistent with P's partaking of the value of those goods. Raz is not alone
in advancing this claim. Other prominent contributors to the "incommensurability" literature, such as Elizabeth Anderson, Martha
Nussbaum, Margaret Radin, and Cass Sunstein, advance the same
claim or closely related claims.' °9 As Sunstein crisply explains, attitudes (specifically, attitudes that preclude monetization) are partly
constitutive of value:
If friendship and cash were commensurable, or if a park and
$100,000 were valued in the same way, we could not have certain attitudes toward friendship and toward parks. Indeed, if parks and
$100,000 could be aligned along the same metric, parks would not be
parks as we now understand them.... [I]ncommensurability ...is desirable as a means of maintaining attitudes and relationships that are
parts of good lives. 10
Or again:
A parent who is asked to trade a child for some sum of money might
well react with outrage and shock and regard the request as insulting.... The recipient of the offer objects not because the amount offered is unconscionably low, but because the kind of valuation is
grotesquely unsuitable. The experience of parenthood is inconsistent
with having an evaluative attitude 1that would permit consideration of
dollar compensation for its sacrifice. II
But is the claim true? I am interested, here, in an internal critique of CBA, relative to the criterion of overall well-being; and I am
interested in whether the supposed disvalue constituted by monetization can override normative considerations in favor of CBA. So let
me rephrase the question as follows: Can the very monetization of
costs and benefits constitute an intrinsic setback to overall well-being,
such that this setback furnishes sufficient welfarist reason against the
performance of CBA, in some choice situation where CBA otherwise
would be morally justified? The answer to this question, I will argue,
is plausibly "No." I will defend this negative answer by considering
108See RAz, supra note 47, at 345-53.
9 See sources cited supra note 27.
"0 Sunstein, supra note 24, at 805.
.' Id. at 813.
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what would seem to be the strongest case for Raz et al.-namely the
case of projects that kill children. If any good is "priceless," in the
sense that the good's very nature and value precludes thinking, believing, or judging it to have a dollar or welfare equivalent, it is surely
the good of parenthood.
Consider three possible scenarios. Consider first a choice situation involving the death of a child where the agency already has reason not to use CBA, quite apart from any second-order constraint on
in dollar terms.'
thinking, believing, or judging children purely
Some governmental projects, as hard as it may be to admit this, will
cause the death of children relative to other options: building infrastructure, approving dangerous drugs, foods, or consumer products,
setting speed limits or vehicle safety specifications, and so on. It
could well be the case that, for a choice situation involving such a
project, the balance of first-order and nonintrinsic second-order considerations already weighs against CBA. For example, the problem of
lexical priority may arise-that is, the parent of the child whom the
project will kill has no well-defined CV since truly no dollar amount
ns
In this scewould suffice to compensate the parent for the loss.
claim that
Razian
the
concede
nario, the advocate of CBA readily can
the very good of parenthood precludes monetization; but this is an
easy concession for her to make because she can also point out that
the Razian claim is superfluous to the moral case against CBA. Costbenefit analysis is already unjustified here, quite apart from the truth
of that claim.
Second, consider the scenario in which the agency has neither
reason to use CBA nor reason against the use of CBA, on the balance
of first-order and nonintrinsic second-order considerations. CBA is
just as good as some other decision procedure: either the two are
equally good, or incomparably good. Here, the Razian claim can do
moral work against CBA. If the other decision procedure does not
implicate the second-order constraint against the pricing of children-and I will not deny that, on the ordinary account of parenthood, such a constraint obtains-then the agency indeed will have

112

By "CBA," here, I mean CBA as classically defined, that is, as the sum of unique

welfare equivalents. The arguments I here develop are equally applicable to any definition of "CBA," for example, as the sum of lowest amounts, or rough substitutes, or
CVs for risk. For simplicity and clarity, I focus on the classic version.
is closer to the truth
11s See, e.g., Regan, supranote 101, at 1068-69 (noting that "it
to say we regard the value of parenthood as incomparably greater than the value of
money, than to say we regard these values as [incomparable]").
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reason to employ that procedure instead of CBA. 1 Note, however,
that the Razian claim here performs only weak moral work against
CBA; it tips the moral balance from precise equality or incomparability between the two procedures, to the existence of reason against
using CBA. We have not yet shown that the Razian claim can do robust moral work, by which I mean the moral work of overriding the
first-order and nonintrinsic second-order considerations that otherwise would make CBA the bestjustified procedure for some choice.
So let us turn to the third scenario: a choice situation involving
the death of a child where the agency, on the balance of first-order
and nonintrinsic second-order considerations, has sufficient reason in
favor of CBA as against all other decision procedures. Here, we must
imagine, the parents affected by child-killing projects do have welldefined CVs for the death of their children; the sum-of-CVs is welldefined and adequately tracks overall well-being;" 5 and CBA is both
cheaper than direct moral deliberation and much more accurate than
yet-more-algorithmic decision procedures such as the invocation of a
de minimis risk threshold. It is only in such a case that the Razian
claim can do robust moral work against CBA. But note, crucially,
what the claim here amounts to. It says that (1) it is constitutive of
the good of parenthood for the affected parent and the agency not to
think, judge, or believe something true (i.e., that there exists a unique
sum of money which, paid to the parent, precisely compensates her
for the loss of her child), and (2) this constraint on thinking, judging,
or believing something true is constitutive of the good of parenthood
even though such thoughts, judgments, or beliefs are required by a
decision procedure (CBA) which is otherwise morally justified.
How can this be? How can it be bad for overall welfare for persons to think, judge, or believe a true proposition in the context of a

"

"Constraint" is my shorthand for intrinsic second-order considerations.

, I suppose that it may be possible for CBA to be bestjustified on the balance of
first-order and nonintrinsic second-order considerations, even if individual CVs or the
sum-of-CVs are not well-defined (that is, CBA followed by either dithering or some way
to choose decisively, such as a coin-flip), although it is hard to imagine how that could
happen. In any event, my argument in the text below focuses on the case in which
CBA is best justified and individual CVs, as well as the sum-of-CVs, are well-defined.
The argument would need to be modified somewhat to deal with the odd case I just
speculated about, but it would rely on the same basic premise: If CBA is bestjustified
on the balance of first-order and nonintrinsic second-order considerations, as compared to all other decision procedures, then the morally best account of goods like
parenthood will permit their pricing in the context of CBA.
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welfare?1
decision procedure that is otherwise justified by overall
The welfarist critic of CBA might start by appealing to the desires or
feelings of parents and other persons, for desires and feelings undergird welfare, on various theories.'1 7 He might say that parents with
true monetary equivalents for the loss of their children, and others,
do not want to think about what that amount is; or that thinking
about this true amount directly causes unpleasant feelings of discomfort, anger, frustration, or embarrassment to these parents and others. Perhaps so. Then again, it is possibly true of any agency decision
procedure that the persons affected by that procedure might not want
agencies to perform it, or might feel bad as a consequence of its performance. This is possibly true, for example, for the alternative procedure where agencies directly apply the criterion of overall wellbeing. To the extent parents truly desire not to price their children
in dollars, or feel bad as a result of doing so, then plausibly to that
extent they also desire not to evaluate the loss of their children in
terms of intra- and interpersonal well-being, or feel bad as a result of
doing that.11 8 Conversely, if agencies, by virtue of parents' feelings
and desires, abandon CBA and direct moral deliberation, and instead
rely on procedures that do not force parents to think true thoughts
about the price or welfare value of their children, then other persons
may suffer welfare setbacks because they desire CBA or deliberation
or resent its absence. Further-and more to the point-a reasonable
theory of well-being is unlikely to give much weight to these brute
desires and feelings against the very procedures otherwise required by
that theory, unless the desires and feelings themselves can be objectively justified by the welfarist goods at stake.
Can these desires and feelings be objectively justified? Raz and
other proponents of "constitutive incommensurabilities" seem to
think so. Their claim is not that persons merely disprefer or feel bad
about the monetization of priceless goods, but rather that monetization is inconsistent with the (objective) nature of these goods, such

16

For literature that, in one way or another, addresses this very important ques-

tion for welfarists and utilitarians, see sources cited supra note 60; see also Dean
Cocking &Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism, Fiendship, and the Problem of Alienation, 106 ETHICS 86 (1995); Barbara Herman, Agency, Attachment, and Difference 101
ETHICS 775 (1991); Neera Badhwar Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the
Best: ConsequentialismandFiendship,101 ETHIcS 483 (1991); William H. Wilcox, Egoists,
Consequentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL & PUB. AFF.73 (1987); Susan Wolf, Moral
Saints, 79J. PHIL. 419 (1982).
117

See supratext accompanying notes 44-45 (describing theories of well-being).

18

See infranote 123 and accompanying text.

1414

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 146:1371

that negative desires and feelings are understandable and appropriate.119 But the difficulty here is showing why the relevant welfarist
good is best interpreted to preclude its pricing. Consider parenthood. The critic of CBA will say that we have an objective welfarist
value or good, Parenthood, such that thinking, etc., about the true
money price of that good objectively degrades its welfare value for
those who participate in it. But why not say that the objective welfarist
value or good is really Parenthood, such that thinking, etc., about the
true money price of that good does not objectively degrade its welfare
value, at least in any context where money pricing otherwise is required by the exigencies of moral deliberation or its procedural
stand-ins?"' Although Parenthoodmay be the common-sense and ordinary account of what parenthood entails, Parenthood*is the account
that is truly best justified, for it is Parenthood*,but not Parenthood,that
permits parenthood to cohere with the need of governments and
citizens to apply moral criteria (either through direct application, or
through substitute decision procedures resting upon those criteria,
such as CBA). Or so the defender of CBA will respond. And the fact
that Parenthood, but not Parenthood*, precludes participants from
thinking, judging, or believing truths about their children is, I suggest,
yet a further reason to count the latter as the best account of what
parenthood objectively requires.
At this point, I see only one viable way to salvage the defense of
intrinsic second-order considerations. That is to say something like
the following.
Parenthoodor Parenthood*

Although Parenthood*seems to be the best account of parenthood when
we simply consider its coherence with the process of moral decisionmaking, Parenthoodturns out to be the best account when we also consider
human psychology. For it is simply impossible, or at least abnormal, as a
matter of human psychology-be it natural psychology or the socially
119See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 27, at 92 (stating that the best conception of human
flourishing "will not be the life of universal commodification"); RAZ, supra note 47, at
348 ("I will argue that significant social forms, which delineate the basic shape of the
projects and relationships which constitute human well-being, depend on a combination of incommensurability with a total refusal even to consider exchanging one incommensurate option for another."); Sunstein, supra note 24, at 804 ("[T]he recognition of an intrinsic good may entail an evaluative attitude that is incompatible with the
use of certain reasons to compromise it.").

'20 On the choice between common-sense and esoteric formulations of the relevant goods, see OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM 32-101 (1991); NUSSBAUM, supra note 27; Cocking & Oakley,
supranote 116.

1998]

INCOMMENSURABILITYAND COST-BENEFiTANALYSIS

1415

constructed psychology of persons in our society-to reap welfare from
Parenthood*. After all, any welfarist good should have certain motivational and affective properties. It should be capable of motivating normal persons to seek it, and it should produce some kind of positive
satisfaction for those who attain it. But Parenthood* cannot do that,
given the psychology of normal persons in our society. Normal parents
are psychologically incapable of believing that children have a money
price and, at the same time, engaging in and reaping satisfaction from
Parenthood2
parenthood with the same engagement that they do under

This response is valid. If indeed Parenthood*is incapable of motivating and satisfying humans like us, then we have sufficient reason to
count Parenthood as the best account of the welfarist good, and, in
turn, to give real weight to the desires and feelings against monetization that parents and other persons experience, or simply to count
monetization as an intrinsic welfare setback quite apart from negative
desires and feelings. But note that the defense of "constitutive incommensurability" ends up resting upon a claim of psychological fact,
namely, that we are built so as to require constituting the relevant
good in a morally suboptimal way. In order to demonstrate that there
exists a second-order constraint against the use of otherwise-justified
CBA, the critic must try to prove this psychological claim, rather than
merely noting (which is true but insufficient) that certain goods may
constrain attitudes, or showing (perhaps true, but again insufficient)
that the ordinary account of certain goods precludes monetization.
Thus far, Raz, Sunstein, and other second-order critics of monetization and CBA have not, to my knowledge, demonstrated the psychological claim.
It is hardly unusual to think that our ordinary, preanalytic understandings, beliefs, and practices may need to give way in light of a
fuller moral analysis. My argument here is that, unless the psychological claim holds true, the preanalytic view of parenthood and other
goods supposedly constituted by a constraint on thinking, etc., about
them in monetary terms should give way to permit the pricing of those
goods, where CBA is otherwise justified. Further (although it is well
beyond the scope of this Article to disprove the psychological claim),
I confess that I find the claim implausible. Americanjuries have been
pricing children in the context of wrongful death suits brought by
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For additional commentary on the psychological feasibility of novel goods or

moral views, see generally FLANAGAN, supra note 120, at 32-101; NUSSBAUM, supra note
27, at 120-22.
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parents for at least the last fifty years.'2 Nonetheless, parents seemingly continue to feel strong affection for their children, and to be
strongly motivated by the project of raising them. If there is no second-order constraint against jury pricing of children in the context of
wrongful death suits, then mutatis mutandis there is no second-order
constraint against agency pricing of children in the context of justified CBA, and a fortiori there is no second-order constraint against
agency pricing of the environment, marriage, friendship, death, risk,
sex, or anything else.
And finally, if CBA must go, then it is likely that so must the direct
application of the welfare criterion. The common-sense view of parenthood, friendship, the environment, and other priceless goods is
that the participant is precluded from thinking, believing, or judging
that her participation in these goods is only valuable qua overall welfare. 123 So if this common-sense account gives rise to desires and feelings against CBA, then similarly it should give rise to desires and
feelings against direct welfarist deliberation-as I have already noted.
And if the common-sense account justifies these negative desires and
feelings in one case, then so should it in the other. The upshot here
is that the intrinsic second-order critique of CBA is not a specific critique of that procedure, but rather a generic critique of any decision
procedure that requires agencies and citizens to evaluate the importance for welfare of goods supposedly constituted by second-order
constraints. If the psychological claim is correct, and the intrinsic
second-order critique goes through, agencies will be constrained
from using any procedure-not just CBA-which involves an honest
assessment of the welfare benefits of such goods.
Let me stress how limited my argument is here. I am not denying
that some constraints on attitudes, and related constraints on behavior, areconstitutive of goods such as parenthood. Rather, my position
is that, if for some person a finite dollar amount would serve to repair
precisely the welfare setback caused by the loss of a child, friend,
mountain, etc., then there is no further constraint on that person's
'2 See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 138-68 (1985) (describing the historical development of wrongful

death suits for the death of children and attendant conceptions of children's value);
see also RADIN, supra note 27, at 102-04 (discussing the psychological possibility of
"incomplete commodification").
'23 Or, for that matter, thinking, believing, or judging that her participation in
those goods is only valuable qua any impartial moral criterion. See sources cited supra
notes 60, 116. In particular, see Railton, supra note 60, at 135-40 (discussing alienation
critique of impartial moral views, particularly utilitarianism).
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identifying that amount in the context ofjustified CBA. This position is
consistent with the following claims, which I do not mean to deny:
It is constitutive of parenthood, etc., that the parent give very significant
weight to the child's welfare, as opposed to the parent's welfare, in determining the parent's actions; or even that the parent think solely of
the child's welfare, in determining the parent's actions.
Relatedly, it is constitutive of parenthood, etc., that the parent not sell
her child, or consider doing so.
It is constitutive of parenthood, etc., not to have persistent, idle
thoughts about the welfare impact of parenthood.
Nor do I mean to deny this claim:
It is constitutive of parenthood, etc., that no dollar amount would repair
precisely the parent's loss of the child.
Again, if this last claim is true (and it may be), then CBA will collapse
by virtue of a conventional ordering failure: the parent's CV will be
undefined. My point is simply that, if the last claim is not true, then
there is no further second-order constraint on pricing children and
other such goods in the context ofjustified CBA.
CONCLUSION
Options are "incommensurable" for an agent, by CBA, with respect to overall well-being, if the agent has welfarist reason not to use
CBA in choosing between those options. Can incommensurability
occur? Of course it can. But we should be clear about what the
grounds for incommensurability are. It is possible, and to some extent plausible, that conventional ordering failures do occur-most
problematically, that CBA gives a higher or equal ranking to an option that in fact degrades overall welfare, or fails to rank two options
that differ qua overall welfare. And conventional ordering failures, in
turn, clearly augment the welfarist case against CBA. (If, for example,
CBA and direct welfarist appraisal are equal with respect to all secondorder considerations, but a conventional ordering failure by CBA
occurs in some choice situation, then the agency will have welfarist
reason to engage there in direct appraisal.) By contrast, esoteric ordering failures may be possible but (at least where the esoteric ordering relation at hand is incomparability) do not augment the welfarist
case against CBA. An esoteric ordering failure is not a true ground of
incommensurability, as surprising as that may sound; the choice between CBA and other procedures ought wholly to depend upon con-
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ventional failures and second-order considerations. In turn, mundane second-order considerations, such as the costliness of CBA, the
likelihood of its misapplication, and so forth, are possible, plausible,
and can augment the welfarist case against CBA. However, the more
intriguing notion of a "constitutive incommensurability," an intrinsic,
second-order constraint that precludes the otherwise-justified use of
that procedure, rests on the (to my mind) implausible and, in any
event, unproven psychological claim that humans cannot be appropriately motivated and affected by friends, children, mountains, etc.,
unless they believe that there is no amount of money that precisely
repairs the loss of such goods, even in scenarios where such an
amount turns out to exist. The upshot is that CBA is indeed vulnerable to an "incommensurability" critique, but one quite different
from that hitherto described by legal scholars and philosophers.
What about a nonwelfarist objection to CBA?; I have focused here
on an internal critique of CBA, relative to the moral criterion of overall well-being. Imagine that, in light of that criterion, CBA is best
justified as against all other decision procedures for some choice
situation. Does the critic of CBA have anything left to say? There are
two possibilities. First, she might say that overall well-being is morally
irrelevant, meaning this: The fact that one option increases overall
welfare, relative to another option, does not provide an agent (or at
least a governmental agent) normative reason to choose the first option. Second, and alternatively, she might say that nonwelfarist considerations are inseparable from considerations of overall well-being,
meaning this: Even if the agent has reason to use CBA in light of
overall well-being, CBA is not part of the complete decision procedure that the agent has reason to use, in light of the totality of moral
considerations, including (but not limited to) overall well-being. The
claim of irrelevance is, I think, wrong, and the claim of inseparability
is at least counterintuitive. But these are not matters I have space to
consider here. The critic of CBA who concedes the welfarist case can
still succeed by showing irrelevance or inseparability, but if she is to
succeed, it is one or the other that she will need to demonstrate.

